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THE FUTURE OF TENANTS' RIGHTS IN
ASSISTED HOUSING UNDER A REAGAN
VOUCHER PLAN: AN ANALYSIS OF
SECTION 8 EXISTING HOUSING CASES
JOAN C WILLIAMS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Around few issues are good intentions so polarized as around the
issues of admissions and evictions in government-assisted housing.'
In the last twenty-five years, a massive number of cases have ex-
tended procedural protections to applicants for,2 and residents of,3
assisted housing.4 In those cases, plaintiffs' lawyers typically advo-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University,
Washington, D.C. J.D. Harvard University/M.C.P. Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology, 1980.
1. This article uses the term "assisted housing" to refer to all types of government
housing programs. These include public housing, privately owned subsidized housing
projects, and programs that provide rent subsidies to tenants living in privately owned
existing housing. Important structural distinctions between these programs will be-
come apparent in the article's analysis of the relevant legal issues, requiring separate
discussion of each scheme. For a synopsis of the major assisted housing programs,
see notes 31-55 and accompanying text infra.
2. See notes 77-224 and accompanying text infra.
3. See notes 242-335 and accompanying text infra.
4. The first major decision concerning procedural rights for tenants in assisted
housing was Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967). Petitioner, a
tenant in a public housing project, argued that the city housing authority violated the
due process clause by terminating her lease without explaining the reasons for its
action. Id at 670-71. In a per curiam opinion, the majority declined to rule on the
merits because of a contemporaneously issued federal administrative order requiring
local officials to explain decisions to evict public housing tenants. Id at 671-72. Jus-
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cate procedural safeguards to ensure that tenants are not deprived of
assisted housing for arbitrary or discriminatory reasons.' Program
administrators disagree, arguing that so-called "safeguards" imposed
by the courts make rational project management impossible and con-
tice Douglas, however, in essence argued for a due process hearing requirement. Id
at 678-79 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The body of case law concerning procedural rights of assisted tenants, developed
primarily in federal district courts, has reflected the periodic structural changes in the
federal government's assisted housing programs. This article reviews these changes.
See notes 77-224, 242-335, and accompanying text infra.
In addition to spurring considerable case law, the issue of tenants' rights in these
assisted housing programs has sparked extensive legal commentary. See, e.g., Blu-
menthal, Housing the Poor Under the Section 8 New Construction Program, 15 URBAN
L. ANN. 281 (1978); Fuerst and Petty, Public Housing in the Courts. Pyrrhic Victories
for the Poor, 9 URB. LAW. 496 (1977); Heen, Due Process Protectionsfor Tenants in
Section 8 Assisted Housing: Prospects for a Good Cause Eviction Standard, 12
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 1 (1978); Klein & Schrider, Procedural Due Process and the
Section 8 Leased Housing Program, 66 Ky. L.J. 303 (1977); Bishop,Asslsted Housing
Under the Housing and Community Development Act of.1974, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv.
672 (1975); Note, The New Leased Housing Program: How Tenantable a Proposition,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 1145 (1975); Note, Procedural Due Process in Government-Subsi-
dizedHousing, 86 HARV. L. REV. 880 (1973); Note, Public Landlords andPrivate Ten-
ants. The Eviction of "Undesirables"from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988
(1968); Note, Non financial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in Public Housing-The
Problem Family in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122 (1968).
5. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Housing Auth. of Louisville, 491 F.2d 793, 798 (6th Cir.),
vacated, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), reinstated, 525 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975) (basis for change
in admissions policies must be reasonable and grounded in purposes of the statute);
Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 1003 (1971) (privilege or right to occupy publicly subsidized low-rent housing is
no less entitled to due process protection than entitlement to other recognized rights
and privileges); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 861 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (government cannot deprive a private citizen
of continued tenancy in public housing without affording adequate procedural safe-
guards); Holmes v. New York City Hous. Auth., 398 F.2d 262, 265 (2d Cir. 1968)
(uncontrolled discretion in government agency vested with administration of vast pro-
gram such as public housing would be intolerable invitation to abuse); Ressler v. Lan-
drieu, 502 F. Supp. 324, 328 (D. Alaska 1980) (due process requires uniform
application of specific criteria to ensure that project owners select tenants based on
ascertainable standards); Neddo v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 335 F. Supp. 1397,
1400 (E.D. Wis. 1971) (policy of summarily rejecting applicant for failure to pay rent
in a previous tenancy, without affording a hearing, is arbitrary and unreasonable);
McDougal v. Tamsberg, 308 F. Supp. 1212, 1214 (D.S.C. 1970) (the day has passed
when a citizen's right to participate in publicly aided and supervised projects can be
irrationally or arbitrarily withheld); Thomas v. Housing Auth. of Little Rock, 282 F.
Supp. 575, 579 (E.D. Ark. W.D. 1967) (housing authority as'public body cannot act
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tribute to the dangerous and run-down conditions of many housing
projects today.6 Officials at the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD)7 add that private landlords will
refuse to participate in housing programs if courts limit their man-
agement discretion by imposing burdensome procedural
requirements.
By the mid-1970's, courts had decided a series of landmark cases
setting the basic outlines of the law on admissions9 and evictions" in
projects built under the public housing program." Concurrently,
however, the public housing program ceased to be the major thrust of
American housing policy.' Courts, therefore, began to hear admis-
sions 3 and evictions' 4 lawsuits involving projects built under the
new generation of "subsidized" housing programs.' 5
6. For a discussion of the arguments of program administrators, see Fuerst &
Petty, supra note 4.
7. Congress has set a national housing policy
to assist the several states and their political subdivisions to remedy the unsafe
and unsanitary housing conditions and the acute shortage of decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings for families of low income and, consistent with the objectives
of this chapter, to rest in local public housing agencies the maximum amount of
responsibility in the administration of their housing programs.
42 U.S.C. § 1437 (1976). To promote this policy, Congress established a series of
assisted housing programs "(f)or the purpose of aiding lower income families in ob-
taining a decent place to live. . . ." Id at § 1437f(a). Congress authorized the Sec-
retary of HUD to prescribe regulations for the delivery of federal payments to assisted
housing programs. Id at § 1437f(c)6.
8. See notes 140-41, 194-96, 317-22, 336-41, and accompanying text infra.
9. See notes 91-99, 127-39, 167-93, and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 250-52, 303-07, and accompanying text infra.
11. For the current text of the public housing program, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437b
(1976). For a synopsis of the public housing program, see notes 31-36 and accompa-
nying text infra.
12. See J. Williams, Subsidized Housing and Tax Expenditure Analysis (June 1,
1980) (unpublished thesis in Massachusetts Institute of Technology library). See also
notes 37-55 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 100-14, 140-46, 167-69, 184-87, 194-96, and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 285-93, 308-10, 314-16, and accompanying text infra.
15. For the text of the subsidized housing programs, see 12 U.S.C. § 17151(d)(3)
(1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (Section 221(d)(3) program); 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980) (Section 236 program); 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979), as
amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357. (Section 8 program). For a synopsis of
these subsidized programs, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra.
All of these programs remain active in that the housing projects produced pursuant
1982]
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In 1981, the Reagan administration announced plans to make dra-
matic changes in national housing programs. The administration has
expressed its intention to replace Section 8 new construc-
tion/substantial rehabilitation,' 6 the major extant federal housing
program, with a new program involving housing vouchers.' 7 The ad-
ministration presently has no plans to combine the voucher plan with
a production program. 8 If the administration implements its propo-
sal to eliminate all production programs, it will have reversed over
forty years of housing policy, which since the Depression has focused
on producing new dwelling units.1 9
This shift will have a significant effect on the legal rights and re-
sponsibilities of federally assisted landlords and tenants,20 and will
present courts with a series of novel legal issues.2 ' Perhaps fortu-
nately, courts can draw on case law involving the previous assisted
housing programs to define the rights of parties in a new housing
voucher program. The most relevant cases are those that concern the
Section 8 existing housing program,22 which is essentially a housing
to these acts still exist. Only the so-called "Section 8" program continues to produce
new projects. The other two programs had ceased active production by 1973.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(2) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357. This "Section 8" program should be distinguished from the Section 8 existing
housing program, id at § 1437f(b)(1). Congress created both programs in the same
statute. Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383,
§ 208(a)8, 88 Stat. 662 (amending the Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 888),
See notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra. This article focuses on the cases in-
volving the Section 8 existing housing program. See notes 115-21, 147-59, 197-224,
311-13, 317-35, and accompanying text infra.
17. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text infra. The author takes no position on
the desirability of the proposed voucher program.
18. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 31-38 and accompanying text infra.
20. See notes 343-74 and accompanying text infra.
21. Id The Section 8 existing housing program involves both governmental and
private actors in decisions involving applicants for and tenants of assisted housing.
See notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra. An aggrieved party's procedural rights
depend on whether a public official or private actor has made an admission or evic-
tion decision. If the administration patterns its housing voucher program after Sec-
tion 8 existing housing, the same issues as have arisen in the Section 8 exisiting
housing context can be expected to arise in the proposed voucher program. See notes
343-74 and accompanying text infra.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357. See also notes 41-55 and accompanying text infra.
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voucher ptogram.23 The administration has stated its intention to in-
clude certain basic structural elements of Section 8 existing housing
in its housing voucher scheme.24 Thus, the existing housing case law
provides a good indication of future tenants' rights litigation25 under
the Reagan administration's proposed voucher program.
After a brief synopsis of assisted housing programs,26 including the
proposed voucher scheme,27 this article engages in a two-part analy-
sis of the future of tenants' rights in assisted housing. First, it exam-
ines the cases involving admissions2" and evictions29 in the Section 8
existing housing program, and relates those cases to decisions involv-
ing the earlier housing production programs. The article then applies
the legal principles developed in the Section 8 existing housing cases
to the Reagan administration's proposed housing voucher plan.3"
II. SYNOPSIS OF ASSISTED HOUSING PROGRAMS
A. The Production Programs: Public and Subsidized Housing
The public housing program 31 was the major assisted housing pro-
gram in existence between 1937 and the mid-1960's. 32 About 1.1 mil-
lion units of public housing are in use today, far more than any
subsequent housing program has produced.33 The public housing
program is run through local housing authorities that develop, own,
and operate the housing projects.34 Thus, any admission or eviction
23. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text infra.
24. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text infra.
25. See notes 343-74 and accompanying text infra.
26. See notes 31-55 and accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text infra.
28. See notes 77-224 and accompanying text infra.
29. See notes 242-333 and accompanying text infra.
30. See notes 343-74 and accompanying text infra.
31. Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1437b (1976)).
32. See H. AARON, SHELTER AND SUBSIDIES 108-44 (1972). This excludes urban
renewal, which had a housing component, but was not primarily designed to produce
housing for low- and moderate-income people.
33. See [19791 HUD STATISTICAL Y.B. 204, 213, tables 62, 71. While equivalent
figures for the Section 221(d)(3) and 236 programs are unavailable, the programs were
smaller in scope than the Section 8 program. See [1974] HUD STATISTICAL Y.B. 75,
table 71; [1971] HUD STATISTICAL Y.B. 152-53, table 164.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(a) (1976).
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decision concerning a public housing applicant or tenant clearly in-
volves "state action""5 for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.36
Three major programs, referred to herein as "subsidized housing
programs,"37 were introduced in the 1960's. Like public housing,
these were "production" programs designed to promote construction
of new housing projects. The subsidized housing programs, how-
ever, differed from their predecessors in that private, subsidized per-
sons replaced the government as developers, owners, and operators of
newly constructed housing.39 The shift from public to private control
raised difficult state action questions when project owners made deci-
sions concerning admissions and evictions.4"
B. Section 8 Existing Housing
The Section 8 existing housing program 4 merits special attention
in this analysis of the future of tenants' rights in a voucher scheme.
The existing housing program differs from other assisted housing ef-
forts in that it does not produce new dwelling units.42 Instead, it
makes existing units43 available to lower-income tenants by supple-
35. See notes 78, 91-99, 127-39, 247-52, 304-07, and accompanying text infra.
36. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
37. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
38. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(d)(3), 1715z-1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
39. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 17151(a), 1715z-l(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437f(b)(1), (2) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357.
This article considers these programs together, although they differed in terms of
the amount and structure of the federal subsidies. The important similarity is that
they all involve federal payments to private landlords to build or substantially reha-
bilitate projects for eligible low-income tenants. Id
40. See notes 78, 101-14, 142-46, 247-52, 284-92, 308-10, 314-16, and accompany-
ing text in/ta. The case law shows that courts ultimately have found state action in
virtually every subsidized housing program. The Sixth Circuit recently drew a bright
line between subsidized housing programs and the "non-subsidized" Section
221(d)(4) mortgage insurance program in Hodges v. Meets, No. 81-5112 (Slip Op.)
(6th Cir., Apr. 30, 1982). The Hodges court held that "governmental involvement in
Section 221(d)(4) programs is (not) so extensive that the actions of the landlord can be
imputed to the government."
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(l) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONrG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357.
42. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(1) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
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menting their rents with direct cash payments to private landlords."
Public housing authorities (PHAs) play an important role in the
operation of the program.45 A PHA that wants to participate in the
program46 must submit an application to HUD highlighting three
major factors: (1) the primary geographical areas from which as-
sisted families will be drawn;47 (2) the number and type of units that
are needed;48 and (3) housing quality standards.49 If HUD approves
an application for funding of a Section 8 existing housing program,
the remaining issue is which families will receive Section 8 existing
housing benefits.5" Qualifying families will receive a housing
voucher, called a Certificate of Family Participation,5 entitling them
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357. HUD regulations governing the existing housing program begin at 24 C.F.R.
§ 882.101 (1980).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(l) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357. See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.105(a) (1980), and notes 51-55 and accompanying text
Only one other major federal housing program utilized existing housing instead of
producing new units. See Housing Act of 1961 § 302(b), Pub. L. No. 87-70, 75 Stat.
149, 166 (1961). For a full description of this program, see C. EDSON, A SECTION 23
PRIMER (1973).
45. 24 C.F.R. § 882.102 (1980) defines the PHA as any state or local government
body authorized "to engage in or assist in the development or operation of housing
for low-income Families."
46. Id
47. Id at § 882.204(a)(3).
48. Id at § 882.204(a)(1), -(2).
49. Id at § 882.204(a)(5).
50. The regulations define eligibility in terms of families qualifying as "Lower
Income Families.. ." Id at § 882.102. A Lower-Income Family has an income that
"does not exceed 80 percent of the median Income for the area as determined by
HUD .. " Id The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act changed the eligibil-
ity standards to require that 95% of all Section 8 units must be rented to "Very Low
Income Families," i.e., families with incomes that do not exceed 50% of an area's
median income. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f1b)(I) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(95 Stat.) 405. For an explanation of the factors HUD uses to compute annual in-
come, see id at § 889.104.
51. Id at § 882.209. Certificates of Family Participation are housing vouchers in
that they entitle qualifying families to receive cash subsidies to offset a percentage of
their monthly rent. In one sense, however, Section 8 existing housing is not a classic
voucher program. In such a program, usually the holder of a voucher receives a direct
subsidy. In the Section 8 scheme, the tenants do not receive the money directly. In-
stead, HUD channels the money through the PHA for payment directly to the private
landlord. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b)(l) (1976), as amended by Omnibus Budget Recon-
1982]
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to pay no more than thirty percent of their income for rent. 2 The
eligible family may then lease any apartment, provided the PHA
finds that the unit meets HUD's housing quality standards,53 the rent
does not exceed HUD's fair market rental limits,5 4 and the landlord
is willing to rent.5
The importance of the Section 8 existing housing program becomes
clear in view of the policy options that the Reagan administration is
considering for assisted housing.
C. The Proposed Housing Allowance
The Reagan administration has clearly indicated its support for a
housing allowance program, though it has not yet adopted a specific
plan. 6 One reason for the delay may be the recognition of a need for
a prolonged assessment of the federal government's future role in
providing housing for the needy. When President Reagan took of-
fice, federal housing subsidies were the third largest and fastest grow-
ing welfare program. 7 The new administration moved quickly to
reverse this trend: housing expenditures were severely cut for fiscal
year 1982,58 and Office of Management and Budget Director David
Stockman recommended elimination of all funding for new subsi-
dized housing units in the fiscal 1983 budget.5 9 Stockman publicly
indicated as early as March, 198160 his preference for a housing pro-
ciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95
Stat.) 357. See also 24 C.F.R. § 882.105(a) (1980).
52. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 403. The budget bill phases in a five percent
increase in family contributions over the next five years. Previously, a family's maxi-
mum monthly contribution was 25% of its monthly income. The regulations vary the
amount of the family's monthly contribution depending on the size of the family and
its monthly income. See 24 C.F.R. § 889.105 (1980).
53. Id at § 882.210(d).
54. Id at § 882.210(b).
55. Id at § 882.210(a)(2).
56. See notes 62-69 and accompanying text infra.
57. See Washington Post, Dec. 4, 1981, at Al, col. 3. Congress had authorized
funding for approximately 200,000 new units. See Id, Dec. 2, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
These projects cost approximately eight billion dollars annually. See id, Dec. 4, 1981,
at A3, col. 2.
58. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 398-400.
59. See Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1981, at A12, col. 3.
60. Id, Feb. 9, 1982, at A9, col. 2. The current interest in replacing the traditional
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gram utilizing existing housing (instead of a production program).
One reason for this preference is that the subsidy cost per unit in the
Section 8 existing housing program is approximately half that of a
new unit subsidized under the Section 8 new construction program.6
To facilitate the shift from a production program to one utilizing
existing housing, the President appointed a Commission on Housing.
The Commission's first interim report, released October 30, 1981,
adopted the reasoning developed by liberal economists in support of
a housing allowance.62 This reasoning is based on data that the
housing problem of the poor is not a supply problem, remediable
through production of new units; instead, it is an income problem
that a targeted income transfer (housing voucher) approach could
solve.63
The Presidential Commission did not specify the details for a new
housing allowance program. Instead, the Commission stated that
"details of program design can best be left to HUD and the state and
production programs with schemes utilizing existing housing makes the case law on
evictions and admissions in an existing housing program particularly relevant. The
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.) 357 hints at this trend. The law recognizes that a unit
of production housing is more costly than a comparable unit of existing housing.
Thus, while allocating more funds for the production programs than for existing
housing, Congress also placed a ceiling on the total Section 8 funds HUD may spend
on producing new units. Id at 399. Consequently, pursuant to this distribution, more
than half of the Section 8 units funded will consist of existing housing. See S. REP.
No. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1981), reprintedin [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 396, 527.
Other activities within the administration indicate widespread support for the ex-
isting housing model. HUD has complemented the administration's support for utiliz-
ing existing housing by supporting a policy change. It has recently publicized a Rand
Corporation study that concluded that rental housing units are not in short supply.
See I. LowRY, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1970's: SEARCHING FOR THE CRISES (April,
1981) (prepared for conference, "The Rental Housing Crisis: Implications for Policy
Development and Research," convened by HUD office of Policy Development and
Research). The Lowry study does not focus on the distinction between market rate
rental housing and rental housing for low-income tenants.
61. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HOUSING, INTERIM REPORT 32-35 (Oct. 30, 1981).
[hereinafter cited as Report]. See also S. REP. No. 97-139, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 231
(1981), reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEWS 396, 527. The Commis-
sion's final report, scheduled for release in late May, 1982, was unavailable at the time
the Urban Law 4nnual went to press.
62. Report, supra note 61, at 35, n.5. See also FRIEDAN & WALTER, WHAT HAVE
WE LEARNED FROM THE HOUSING ALLOWANCE EXPERIMENT 14 (1980); A. SOLO-
MON, HOUSING THE URBAN POOR 78-88 (1974).
63. Report, supra note 61, at 3-4, 6, 11-21.
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local agencies charged with program administration."' Nevertheless,
it still recommends that a "consumer-oriented housing assistance
grant system should draw on the experience in Section 8 Existing
Housing,"65 and "should also take advantage of the administrative
expertise that has already been acquired by state and local agencies
in the course of Section 8.,"66
The Commission's general guidelines suggest that the new housing
voucher scheme will parallel the Section 8 existing housing program
in certain fundamental ways. The most basic similarity is that par-
ticipants will receive vouchers and must find housing in the private
market, presumably from landlords of small rental apartments.67 In
addition, the housing voucher program, like Section 8 existing hous-
ing, would not be an entitlement program.68 Finally, the program
will probably designate local housing authorities as the entities
charged with allocating the relatively small number of housing
vouchers among the relatively large number of eligible applicants. 69
D. The Importance of Prior Case Law in Anayzing Tenants' Rights
in a Housing Voucher Program
Federal housing programs have come and gone in a fitful and er-
ratic fashion.70 Nevertheless, when courts have faced litigation in-
volving new and unfamiliar housing programs, they have consistently
turned to case law developed under prior assisted housing programs.
Unfortunately, most law review articles7 have not undertaken any
sustained comparison of public housing cases with cases involving
subsidized projects. As federal housing policy moves into a third ma-
jor era," it is appropriate to undertake a detailed analysis of judicial
treatment of basic admissions and evictions issues in each successive
housing program. Analysis of cases involving prior housing pro-
grams should also provide some insight into the courts' probable fu-
ture behavior when applying precedent which involves the existing
64. Id at 40.
65. Id
66. Id
67. Id at 6, 40-42. See also notes 51-55 and accompanying text su.pra.
68. Report, supra note 61, at 41.
69. Id at 42.
70. See notes 31-55 and accompanying text supra.
71. See articles listed at note 4 and accompanying text supra.
72. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text supra.
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housing program to a Reagan housing voucher program.73 The fol-
lowing two sections of this article, therefore, review the case law on
admissions to,74 and evictions from,75 Section 8 existing housing in
the context of prior case law involving public and subsidized
housing.76
III. CASE LAW ON ADMISSIONS TO SECTION 8 EXISTING HOUSING
IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIOR ASSISTED HOUSING CASES
A. Overview
The cases involving admissions of tenants to public and subsidized
projects have raised three major issues. One line of cases, beginning
with Holmes v. New York City Housing Authoriy,77 required housing
authorities to follow certain due process procedures when choosing
among applicants eligible for public or subsidized housing.78 In a
second series of cases, courts held that applicants rejected from public
73. See notes 343-74 and accompanying text infra.
74. See notes 77-224 and accompanying text infra.
75. See notes 242-335 and accompanying text infra.
76. See note 60 supra.
77. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
78. See notes 91-114 and accompanying text infra. In public housing, applicants
and tenants challenging decisions contest the actions of PHAs which clearly are crea-
tures of state government. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437b(a) (1976). In subsidized housing,
however, private landlords who make the same decisions have no relation with state
government. Any semblance of a governmental character is based on the landlord's
ties to the federal rather than the state government. See notes 39-40 and accompany-
ing text supra.
Tenants' lawyers originally did not focus on this distinction. In an early case,
McGuane v. Chenango Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 994 (1971), plaintiffs sued solely on state action grounds pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 431 F.2d at 1190. The court dismissed the suit, distinguishing away the state
action in public housing cases that tenants' lawyers cited. Id at 1190-91. Similarly,
in Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545 (8th Cir. 1973), the court said "the state
action concept [cannot be extended] to a federally financed but privately owned and
operated apartment house merely because a state assesses real estate taxes on this
property at a lower rate than that assessed equivalent structures not similarly funded
* . .", id at 548, and because the landlord used state eviction procedures. Id
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit accepted plaintiffs' state action claims in a suit
based on the fourteenth amendment. In Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973),
the court said state and federal involvement in subsidized projects was state action.
Id at 1239. The Joy court cited as evidence of state action both federal and state
involvement with subsidized projects, and focused on a detailed examination of
whether the subsidized landlord had "so far insinuated (itself) into a position of inter-
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and subsidized projects must receive due process hearings.79 In this
second series of cases judges have applied a double standard of pro-
cedural protection. They have accorded greater weight to tenants'
rights inpublic housing projects,"0 while generally deferring to the
landlords' interest in broad management discretion in private, subsi-
dized projects."1 In a third series of cases, courts have barred the use
of certain criteria for choosing among otherwise eligible applicants."
In public and subsidized housing, tenants' rights issues invariably
turn on the treatment given an application for a specific apartment.
Section 8 existing housing cases, by contrast, can involve either of
dependence" as to be a state actor. Id (citation omitted). Virtually all subsequent
cases, including Second Circuit decisions, have followed Joy.
In Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1974), Judge
Friendly made a conscientious effort to reconcile himself to the notion that federal
involvement could result in a finding of state action. "(T)here is a puzzlement how
the receipt offederal aid creates state action to which 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(3) apply. The puzzlement is lessened-perhaps eliminated-when the federal
assistance is conditioned upon state action or supervision is vested in a state or munic-
ipal agency." (citations omitted). Id at 942, n.2.
The best solution to the "puzzlement" was simply to sue under the fifth amendment
rather than either the fourteenth amendment or Section 1983 because fifth amend-
ment suits require evidence of federal, not state action. Plaintiffs later abandoned the
fourteenth amendment to bring causes of action under the fifth amendment require-
ment of federal action. See Short v. Fulton Redevelopment Co., Inc., 390 F. Supp.
517, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (tenants in subsidized housing projects claimed fifth and
fourteenth amendments protect their property right in continuing to live in their
apartments); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1256 (W.D. Va. 1973) (tenants
have right to procedural protection under fifth and fourteenth amendments prior to
eviction from subsidized housing). See also Green v. Copperstone Ltd. Partnership,
28 Md. App. 498, 502, 346 A.2d 686, 689 (1975) (tenant in subsidized housing project
claims property right entitling her to due process under fifth and fourteenth
amendments).
79. See notes 127-39 and accompanying text infra.
80. See, e.g., Neddo v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D.
Wis. 1971). Congress has also acted to afford rejected applicants to public housing
procedural protection. The law requires PHAs to notify applicants of ineligibility de-
cisions, and to provide rejected applicants with informal hearings. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437d(c)(3) (1976). See also notes 127-39 and accompanying text infra.
81. See notes 140-46, and accompanying text infra. HUD recognizes in its regula-
tions a distinction between publicly and privately owned housing in considering the
procedural rights of rejected applicants. Landlords of subsidized projects need only
inform such persons of the reasons for the rejection in informal interviews. 24 C.F.R.
§§ 880.603(b)(3), 881.603(b)(3) (1980). If a PHA owns the project, it must provide the
same type of informal hearing that HUD requires in the public housing context. Id
82. See notes 160-96 and accompanying text infra.
83. See notes 31-39 and accompanying text supra.
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two separate steps that are required before an existing housing tenant
obtains a subsidized unit. First, candidates must apply for a Certifi-
cate of Family Participation entitling them to a rent subsidy.84 If
successful at this first stage, the recipient of a Certificate then must
find a landlord willing to rent an apartment that meets HUD's speci-
fications.8 5 Thus, tenants' rights cases in the context of Section 8 ex-
isting housing involve two tiers of activity. The upper tier concerns
the actions of the housing authority in issuing Certificates of Family
Participation. The lower tier focuses on the individual landlord's de-
cision to admit or reject the certified applicant.
This two-tier analysis is crucial to understanding the rights of ap-
plicants to Section 8 existing housing. The three major issues from
the public and subsidized housing context re-emerge here, but receive
very different treatment depending on the tier of activity involved. In
upper-tier cases, involving governmental allocation of Certificates of
Family Participation, courts tend to follow the precedent developed
in the public housing cases. Key elements of this law include:
(1) the application of Holmes-type due process standards to housing
authorities' processing of Certificates; 6 (2) the granting of proce-
dural due process protections similar to those granted to public hous-
ing applicants for (i) applicants for certificates and to (ii) tenants
whose certificates have been terminated; 7 and (3) the prohibition on
housing authorities from using certain criteria that courts also disap-
proved in the public housing context.88
In sharp contrast, the procedural rights of applicants to Section 8
existing housing largely disappear on the lower tier of activity. At
this lower level, involving the approved applicant's search for a qual-
ifying apartment, landlords and tenants generally have agreed that
the landlord's decision to accept or reject an application is purely a
private matter. 90 This absence of state action leaves a disappointed
applicant little legal recourse.
84. See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
85. See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 115-21 and accompanying text infra.
87. See notes 148-59 and accompanying text infra.
88. See notes 197-224 and accompanying text infra.
89. See note 121-2, 148, 238-40 and accompanying text supra.
90. Research uncovered no cases on point. At least one HUD attorney believes
that tenants have not litigated this matter. Telephone interview with Herbert Levy,
HUD Associate Regional Counsel, in New York City (Feb. 12, 1982).
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The remainder of this section analyzes the Section 8 existing hous-
ing case law concerning admissions in the context of prior case law.
B. Due Process Requirements in Processing Applications
for Assisted Housing
Courts have consistently required administrators to use fair and
equitable procedures for processing applications for all types of as-
sisted housing. In 1968, the Second Circuit's decision in Holmes v.
New York City Housing Authority9' established the basic due process
requirements in the context of public housing.92 Other courts subse-
quently have applied Holmes' principles to subsidized housing
projects, 93 and probably will apply them to housing authorities'
processing of applications for Certificates of Family Participation in
Section 8 existing housing. 4
The Second Circuit's statement of facts and holding in Holmes
demonstrates that courts will not tolerate sloppy or unfair procedures
for choosing among eligible applicants:
The complaint cites numerous claimed deficiencies in the ad-
missions policies and practices of the Authority. Regulations on
admissions (other than those pertaining to income level and resi-
dence) are not made available to prospective tenants either by
publication or by posting in a conspicuous public place. Appli-
cations received by the Authority are not processed chronologi-
cally, or in accordance with ascertainable standards, or in any
other reasonable and systematic manner. All applications,
whether or not considered and acted upon by the Authority, ex-
pire automatically at the end of two years. A renewed applica-
tion is given no credit for time passed, or precedence over a first
application of the same date. There is no waiting list or other
device by which an applicant can gauge the progress of his case
and the Authority refuses to divulge a candidate's status on re-
quest. Many applications are never considered by the Authority.
If and when a determination of ineligibility is made (on any
ground other than excessive income level), however, the candi-
date is not informed of the Authority's decision, or of the reasons
therefor.95
91. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
92. Id at 264.
93. See notes 100-14 and accompanying text infra.
94. See notes 120-21 and accompanying text infra.
95. 398 F.2d at 264.
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The Holmes court first concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to due
process.96 Noting the potential for abuse when a program adminis-
trator operates with unbridled discretion, the court said "due process
requires that selections among applicants be made in accordance with
ascertainable standards."97 Further, the court insisted that PHAs use
objective and reasonable standards for selection.9" After setting this
procedural structure, the court dismissed the PHA's argument that
applicants for public housing lack standing to raise the due process
objection to bureaucratic administration of the program.99
In Colon v. Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. ," the Southern Dis-
trict federal court of New York applied Holmes to the context of sub-
sidized housing. The Colon court insisted that private landlords of
subsidized housing must afford rejected applicants Holmes-type pro-
cedural protection.' ° ' Characterizing the shift from public to subsi-
dized housing as "a distinction without a difference,"' 2 the court
rejected the defendants' contention that public housing case law did
not apply in a subsidized housing case.' °3 Taking a broad view of
government action, the court ordered the landlord to set a reasonable
time limit on its processing of applications and to establish a chrono-
logical waiting list for eligible participants."°4
The success of the Colon plaintiffs, however, is somewhat clouded
because of language in the decision that distinguishes public housing
96. Id
97. Id at 265.
98 Id
99. Id (all applicants for public housing "are immediately affected by the alleged
irregularities in the practices of the Authority"). Id
100. 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
101. Id at 139.
102. Id at 137.
103. Id at 137-38. Initially, the court established that governmental action ex-
isted. The apartments in question occupied an urban renewal site. The project also
received federal financing, local tax exemptions, and a variety of governmental subsi-
dies. Id at 137. New York officials also played a supervisory role in administering
the projects. Id
After establishing governmental involvement with the private units, the court
turned to the agency's violation. "By virtue of the state's election to put its property,
power and prestige behind the housing project, in addition to its failure to affirma-
tively insure strict adherence to constitutional guarantees, it thereby becomes a party
to the alleged discrimination." Id at 138.
104. Id at 139.
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tenants' rights from the rights of tenants in subsidized projects.' 0 5
The court demonstrated a sensitivity toward subsidized landlords'
prerogatives that was absent from the public housing context.'0 6 The
Colon court stressed that its conclusion:
is not to say that tenants must be selected on the basis of a "point
system" or on the theory of "first come, first served". It is un-
questionably beneficial to the apartment project as a whole if the
element of human judgment and discretion is allowed to remain
with the Rental Committee in the administration of its tenant
selection procedure so long as that discretion is not permitted to
transcend the boundaries established by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. 0 7
Colon was one of the earliest decisions to indicate that courts might
approve different approaches in public and subsidized housing cases.
Subsequently, legislation became increasingly solicitous of the discre-
tion of private landlords to manage their subsidized housing projects
without cumbersome due process requirements.' 08 Simultaneously,
courts have become increasingly adamant in requiring public hous-
ing authorities to offer public housing tenants more extensive proce-
dural rights."0 9
A recent case demonstrates, however, that not all courts believe
that tenants in subsidized housing projects should have less proce-
dural protection than do public housing tenants. In Ressler v. Lan-
drieu,110 plaintiffs seeking admission to a subsidized housing project
raised classic Holmes issues."' The Alaska federal district court,
finding for the plaintiffs,"' required the project owners to establish




108. See notes 140-46, 194-96, 250-52 and accompanying text infra.
109. See notes 129-41, 160-61, 167-93, 251 and accompanying text infra.
110. 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska 1980).
111. Id at 327-30.
112. id at 326.
113. Id at 328. In a recent order, the court detailed the tenant selection criteria
project owners must use. Such criteria "must relate to the eligibility of the applicant
to fulfill lease obligations and should not automatically deny tenancy to a particular
group or category of otherwise eligible applicants." Examples of acceptable criteria
given are (a) "demonstrated ability to pay rent ...; (b) good credit references;
(c) positive endorsements from prior landlords; (d) absence of a record of distur-
bance of neighbors, destruction of property, or living or housekeeping habits at prior
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procedures along Holmes lines."I4
With the creation of the Section 8 existing housing program, chal-
lenges to housing authorities' procedures for allocating Certificates of
Family Participation were inevitable, and relatively prompt. Only
one court, however, has ruled on the procedural requirements for
processing applications for this program. In Baker v. Cincinnati Met-
ropolitan Housing Authority," the plaintiffs claimed that the housing
authority had violated due process by failing to publicize one of its
acknowledged selection policies." 6 The court distinguished
Holmes," 7 holding that the housing authority had not violated due
process by failing to publicize its policy."' The court did say, how-
ever, that "publication and dissemination of the standards would be
logical and salutory."' 9
In another case involving facts closer to Holmes, the plaintiffs in
Solomon v. New York City Housing Authority120 won Holmes-type
procedures for the processing of their applications for Certificates of
Family Participation. In a court approved settlement agreement, the
Housing Authority agreed to protections that include: (1) assigning
eligible applicants to positions on a waiting list; (2) requiring the
housing authority to disclose to applicants their position on the list;
and (3) offering applicants the opportunity to challenge the housing
authority if they are dissatisfied with the progress of their
applications.' 2 '
Research revealed no cases involving a Holmes-type suit challeng-
ing the procedures that private landlords use to reject a prospective
tenant who has a Certificate of Family Participation. Apparently,
potential plaintiffs have opted not to challenge potential landlords
who use unfair procedures in rejecting their applications. Disap-
residences which may adversely affect. . . other tenants; or (e) other good reasons
relating to the applicants' ability to fulfill lease obligations." Order No. A77-228
Civil, filed July 28, 1981.
114. 502 F. Supp. at 329.
115. 490 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1980), afl'don other grounds, No. 80-3441 (6th
Cir. Apr. 20, 1982).
116. Id at 522.
117. Id at 530.
118. Id
119. Id
120. No. 79 Civ. 3591 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 1981).
121. Id.
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pointed applicants may consider such a lawsuit impractical because it
would involve asking a court to impose due process requirements
upon every private landlord who happened to be approached (unsuc-
cessfully) by the holder of a Section 8 certificate.
C. Due Process Hearings/or Rejected Applicants
Just as courts in most contexts have imposed Holmes-like due pro-
cess standards on governmental entities that process applications for
assisted housing, they also have consistently required that prospective
tenants denied admission to assisted housing receive due process
hearings. Courts have differed, however, on the level of due process
required. After several decisions mandated due process hearings for
applicants to public housing projects, 122 Congress changed the en-
abling statute to require PHAs to offer a hearing to any interested
person." 3 In the subsidized housing context, HUD's current regula-
tions require that owners of subsidized housin§projects provide only
informal "interviews" for rejected applicants.' In the Section 8 ex-
isting housing program, applicants have received both more and less
protection than subsidized housing tenants receive. The courts have
required housing authorities to provide notice and opportunity for a
hearing to applicants disappointed on the upper tier of the existing
housing program (the denial or termination of a Certificate of Family
Participation). 25 Rejected tenants apparently do not fare so well on
the lower tier."2 6 A review of the cases in this area follows.
1. Public Housing Cases
The first public housing cases establishing the right to due process
hearings for an applicant rejected from public housing were based
upon the Supreme Court's decision in Goldberg v. Kell,.'27 The
Goldberg Court held that the termination of one's right to receive a
122. Neddo v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 335 F. Supp. 1397, 1400 (E.D. Wis.
1971) (housing authority's policy of rejecting applicant owing money in prior tenancy,
without affording a hearing, is arbitrary and unreasonable); Davis v. Toledo Metro-
politan Hous. Auth., 311 F. Supp. 795, 797 (N.D. Ohio 1970) (those seeking eligibility
for public benefits entitled to opportunity for evidentiary hearing prior to declaration
of ineligibility).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(c)(3) (1976).
124. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.603(b)(3), 881.603(b)(3)(1980).
125. Id at § 882.209(f).
126. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra.
127. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that qualifying
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governmental benefit deprives the former recipient of a property
right. Consequently, due process requires a hearing to ensure ade-
quate procedural protection.1 28  In Davis v. Toledo Metropolitan
Housing Authority,129 an Ohio federal district court applied the
Goldberg holding 3' to support its decision that applicants rejected
from public housing also deserve a hearing.' The court did not
address the factual difference between the two cases: Goldberg in-
volved the termination of a governmental benefit, while Davis con-
cerned the rejection of an application for a benefit. 132 Thus, it was not
as clear in Davis as it had been in Goldberg that theplaintiffs had lost
a property right requiring a due process hearing. 3
In Neddo v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee, 134 a federal district
court in Wisconsin also ignored the factual difference between
Goldberg and the public housing situations. 135 Yet, the Neddo court
went far beyond Davis in specifying the amount of due process a
housing authority must afford to a rejected applicant. 136 The court
did not require a record or witnesses under oath, but did insist that
rejected applicants receive written notice, the right to counsel, and a
statement of the reasons for the authority's decision.'
37
persons are statutorily entitled to receipt of welfare benefits, and that recipients must
receive procedural due process prior to termination. Id at 266.
128. Id at 267.
129. 311 F. Supp. 795 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
130. Id at 796-97.
131. Id at 797.
132. The fact that a governmental benefit already granted is a property right does
not necessarily mean that the right to apply for a governmental benefit is a property
right. The court conceded that the irreparable harm to plaintiffs in Goldberg was
clearer than in Davis. The court concluded, however, that the risk of delay in process-
ing an application required that tenants receive a hearing to determine their status.
Id
133. The factual distinction between Goldberg and Davis is clear. In Goldberg,
the appellees faced the loss of welfare benefits that they were already receiving pursu-
ant to state law. Thus, the Court addressed the narrow issue of the scope of due
process required prior to termination of an existing property interest. 397 U.S. at 260.
Conversely, in Davis, plaintiffs had no government benefit amounting to a property
interest. They argued successfully, however, that they were entitled to due process to
confront those who had denied their eligibility for the benefit. 311 F. Supp. at 796-97.
134. 335 F. Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
135. Id at 1400.
136. Id at 1400-01.
137. Id at 1400.
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Subsequently, courts disagreed on the issue of what procedural
protection a rejected applicant to public housing is entitled to re-
ceive. 138 In 1976, HUD settled the issue by promulgating a regula-
tion that requires housing authorities to provide Neddo-type hearings
to disappointed applicants.139
2. Subsidized Housing Cases
HUD has also promulgated guidelines for subsidized landlords to
follow when rejecting prospective tenants.1 40 The requirements do
not require subsidized landlords to follow procedures as formal as
those HUD requires of PHAs. In fact, the regulations seem designed
to afford tenants a minimal amount of due process while imposing
the lightest possible burden on subsidized project landlords. The reg-
ulations provide that if a landlord determines that:
an applicant is ineligible on the basis of income or family com-
position, or that the owner is not selecting the applicant for other
reasons, the owner will promptly notify the applicant in writing
of the determination, the reasons for the determination, and that
the applicant has the right to meet the owner or managing agent
in accordance with HUD requirements. Where the owner is a
PHA (public housing authority), the applicant may request an
informal hearing. If the PHA determines that the applicant is
not eligible, the PHA will notify the applicant that he has the
right to recuest a review by HUD of the PHA's
determination. 4 1
This regulation clearly reflects the double standard courts have ap-
138. See Sumpter v. White Plains Hous. Auth., 29 N.Y.2d 420, 278 N.E.2d 892,
328 N.Y.S.2d 649 (1972), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 928 (1972), where a New York court
held that a rejected applicant has only the right to an informal interview. Sunter is
still the law governing rejection of applicants from city-financed public housing. See
Gomez v. Christian, 104 Misc. 2d 354, 355-56, 428 N.Y.S. 2d 431, 432-33 (1980). See
also Singleton v. Drew, 485 F. Supp. 1020 (E.D. Wis. 1980), the only case to address
the central issue of whether a rejected public housing applicant has less of a constitu-
tional property interest than does a tenant facing eviction. Id at 1024. The Singleton
court could safely face this issue because it held HUD regulations mooted the issue.
Id See also Billington v. Underwood, 613 F.2d 91 (5th Cir. 1980) for a detailed
discussion of whether specific procedures satisfy due process requirements.
139. 24 C.F.R. § 860.207 (1980).
140. For rules currently applicable to new construction projects, see id at
§ 880.603(b)(3) (1980). For rules currently involving substantial rehabilitation prop-
erty, see id at § 881.603(b)(3). For a discussion of HUD's initial rules on these pro-
grams, see the New Leased Housing Program, supra note 4, at 1206.
141. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.603(b)(3) 881.603(b)(3) (1980).
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plied to the actions of public housing authorities, as opposed to pri-
vate, subsidized landlords.
The origin of this regulation is unclear from a review of reported
case law. Nonetheless, only one court has required a subsidized
landlord to offer a rejected applicant more than the minimal due pro-
cess required by the regulation. In Ressler v. Landrieu,142 the federal
district court in Alaska required the defendant landlord to offer re-
jected applicants 43 more than an informal interview in which the
landlord explains the reasons for rejecting the applicant. 44 The
court cited public housing141 cases and a Section 8 existing housing
case in support of its holding that a rejected applicant must receive an
informal hearing before an impartial HUD employee. 146 It remains
unclear whether Ressler will stand alone, or if it signals a rethinking
of what due process procedures applicants must receive when re-
jected from private, subsidized projects.
3. Section 8 Existing Housing
Three different sets of rules govern the due process procedures to
which Section 8 existing housing applicants are entitled.
On the lower level of the existing housing program, applicants re-
ceive no due process protection. Private landlords are free to reject
potential tenants holding Certificates of Family Participation without
providing even an informal statement of their reasons for doing so.'47
In sharp contrast, on the upper level of the existing housing pro-
gram, PHAs are required to provide due process hearings to people
affected by their allocation of Certificates.
142. 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska 1980). The regulations cited in note 141 supra
did not apply in Ressler because Ressler involved the so-called Section 8 "set-aside"
program. Id. at 325. The cited regulations apply only to the Section 8 new construc-
tion and substantial rehabilitation programs.
143. Id at 329.
144. Id at 330.
145. Id
146. Id. The Section 8 existing housing case cited was Ferguson v. Metropolitan
Dev. and Hous. Auth., 485 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). See notes 202-09, 224a
and accompanying text infra.
147. See notes 89-90 and accompanying text supra. This finding is perhaps not
surprising, since requiring potential landlords to give interviews (much less hearings)
to every rejected existing housing applicant would force due process obligations on
any landlord who happened to be approached by a potential tenant with a Certificate
of Family Participation.
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The procedures a PHA must follow in rejecting an applicant are set
forth in Baker v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority. 148 The
Ohio federal district court in Baker held that an applicant denied a
Certificate is entitled to due process procedures more formal than the
"informal interview" that HUD regulations require for applicants re-
jected from Section 8 new construction/substantial rehabilitation
projects,' 49 but less formal than the Neddo-type hearing' 5 ° required
by the Ressler v. Landrieu court. 5 ' The Baker court held that, while
the rejected applicant is entitled to make an oral presentation at a
post-denial hearing, the PHA could present its case through docu-
ments instead of witnesses.' 52
Courts have required considerably more elaborate due process
hearings when a PHA decides to terminate a family's Certificate of
Family Participation.' 5 Three courts have required an oral pre-
termination hearing in this context, in Watkins v. Mobile Housing
Board, 154 Brezina v. Dowdall,155 and Ferguson v. Metropolitan Depel-
opment Housing Authority. 156 Watkins and Ferguson are explicit in
requiring full Goldberg procedures.'57 The Brezina decision'5 8 does
not spell out specific procedures but notes only that an informal hear-
ing is required.'5 9
148. 490 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1980). The Sixth Circuit's affirmance of Baker
did not discuss this issue. No. 80-3441 (6th Cir., April 20, 1982).
149. See notes 140-41 and accompanying text supra.
150. See note 134 and accompanying text supra.
151. 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska 1980).
152. 490 F. Supp. at 533.
153. Termination of a Certificate is, of course, much closer to the basic Goldberg
v. Kelly fact pattern. Goldberg involved termination of welfare benefits.
154. No. 79-0067-P (S.D. Ala. May 14, 1979).
155. 472 F. Supp. 82 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
156. 485 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Tenn. 1980).
157. Goldberg hearing procedures include written notice, a right to an impartial
decisionmaker, a right to counsel, a right to confront and cross-examine witness, a
right to present oral and written evidence, a right to a decision that explains the rea-
sons that support it, and a right to appeal. (As enumerated in Ferguson, 485 F. Supp.
at 524.)
158. Brezina's failure to spell out specific hearing procedures may be due to the
fact that the Brezina court's decision is based on part on a HUD regulation requiring
a PHA to offer an "informal hearing" whenever a PHA refuses to renew a family's
Certificate in a situation where the family wants a renewed Certificate so it can move
into a new apartment. (This regulation does not spell out specific hearing proce-
dures). See 24 C.F.R. § 882.209(e)(1) (1980), quoted at 492 F. Supp. at 84.
159. The due process procedures required in Watkins and Ferguson more closely
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D. Cases Challenging or Limiting Use of Certain Criteria for
Tenant Selection
The dichotomy between tenants' rights in public and subsidized
housing projects becomes very clear in cases involving the use of var-
ious tenant selection criteria. Courts have barred the use of a number
of these criteria in the public housing context on a variety of constitu-
tional and statutory grounds, 60 generally sympathizing with prospec-
tive tenants who have challenged standards that public housing
authorities used as guidelines for admission. 16' Courts have been far
more reluctant to uphold similar challenges involving subsidized
housing projects. In this context, they have shown greater sensitivity
to subsidized landlords' fears that any limits placed on their ability to
screen tenants will jeopardize the landlords' ability to manage their
projects. 162
The use of criteria for allocating Certificates of Family Participa-
tion is the most actively litigated admissions issue in the Section 8
existing housing context. One reason is that HUD has urged housing
authorities to establish formal priorities whose existence is easy to
prove. 163 Second, government action clearly is involved in the upper
tier, 6' although it is absent from the lower tier of Section 8 existing
housing activity.
This section begins with a review of the case law on selection crite-
ria in the public and subsidized housing programs.1 65 It then reviews
the three reported cases involving the Section 8 existing housing pro-
gram which have yielded inconsistent results. 166
resemble procedures required prior to eviction than procedures required in connection
with admissions. Ferguson even quotes public housing eviction cases, stating that
they involve "factual situations similar to the one before this Court." 485 F. Supp. at
523. These courts seem justified in requiring the (more elaborate) due process proce-
dures required in eviction cases in the context of decisions involving terminations of
Certificates of Family Participation, because termination of a Certificate presumably
will lead very often to eviction of the family involved due to non-payment of rent. (If
the family involved could afford to pay the portion of the rent subsidized under Sec-
tion 8, it would not have been eligible for the Section 8 program in the first place).
160. See notes 167-76, 188-93, and accompanying text infra.
161 Id
162. See notes 194-96 and accompanying text infra.
163. See notes 197-201 and accompanying text infra.
164. See notes 197-98 and accompanying text infra.
165. See notes 167-96 and accompanying text infra.
166. See notes 202-24 and accompanying text infra.
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1. Public and Subsidized Housing Cases
Courts have summarily rejected the attempts of both PHAs and
subsidized landlords to reject an applicant for reasons held to be ille-
gal or unconstitutional. These decisions have forbidden criteria
based on race, 167 or on an applicant's constitutionally protected
rights such as free speech' 68 and travel.
169
Courts have found questions concerning other selection criteria
considerably more difficult. The earliest decisions involved due pro-
cess and equal protection challenges to housing authorities' practice
of automatically rejecting unwed mothers.170 This practice occurred
primarily in the South in the late 1960's, and courts used different
theories to forbid it. In Thomas v. Housing Authority of Little
Rock, 17 1 a federal district court held that automatic rejection of wo-
men with illegitimate children violated due process.' 72 The court said
that "(s)uch a policy simply has no place in the low rent housing
program and in that sense is arbitrary and capricious."'17' A South
Carolina federal district court reached the same result in McDougal v.
167. Rejection of a housing applicant because of race may violate the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)
(proof of discriminatory intent, not effect, is required to establish constitutional viola-
tions). It may also violate the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1976).
See, e.g., United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
168. See, e.g., Holt v. Richmond Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 266 F. Supp.
397, 401 (E.D. Va. 1966) (injunction granted to block eviction of tenants who ex-
ercised first amendment rights).
169. In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Supreme Court held that
residency requirements for eligibility for welfare assistance were unconstitutional re-
strictions on the right to travel. Id at 629. Lower federal courts subsequently applied
this holding to the public housing context. See King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous.
Auth., 314 F. Supp. 427, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cer.
denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971) (five-year residency requirement for admission to state
and locally subsidized public housing is unconstitutional restraint on right to travel);
Cole v. Housing Auth. of Newport, 312 F. Supp. 692, 703 (D.R.I. 1970), af'd, 435
F.2d 807 (1st Cir.. 1970) (residency requirement interferes with basic human right to
geographic mobility which is constitutionally protected). But see Lane v. McGarry,
320 F. Supp. 562, 564 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (one-year state residency requirement prior to
application does not necessarily penalize the constitutional right to travel).
170. See notes 171-76 and accompanying text infra.
171. 282 F. Supp. 575 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
172. Id at 580.
173. Id at 581. The court adopted this due process approach from Rudder v.
United States, 226 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955), where the court forbade arbitrary evic-
tion from public housing on suspicion the tenant was a Communist. Id at 53.
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Tamsberg,174 but it applied an equal protection theory. 175 The court
required the housing authority to show that it had not arbitrarily ex-
cluded the plaintiff because she had an illegitimate child and to make
a prima facie showing that her conduct amounted to a nuisance. 176
The equal protection theory seems more appropriate in this context
than does a due process argument. Plaintiffs are contesting the lack
of a "tight fit" between the classification (mothers with illegitimate
children), and the purpose of the policy (to prevent the use of public
housing for prostitution and other "conduct amounting to a nuisance
or which seriously violates ordinary standards of decency"). 17 HUD
has appropriately taken notice of these decisions and has forbidden
automatic rejection of unwed mothers for public housing tenancy. 78
The other major series of cases challenging the constitutionality of
selection criteria involves those guidelines for screening out the very
poor. While it may seem ironic that assisted-housing landlords have
fought to exclude the poorest potential tenants, they had a variety of
motives. These reasons include the desire of public housing agencies
to avoid bankruptcy,'79 the preference of some landlords of subsi-
dized housing projects to attract the "right" kind of tenants18 0 and to
increase their cash flow, and the interest of all such landlords in
screening out "problem" families.' 8 '
174. 308 F. Supp. 1212 (D.S.C. 1970).
175. Id at 1215.
176. Id at 1216.
177. Id
178. 24 C.F.R. § 860.204(c) (1980). The regulation however specifically does not
apply to the Section 8 programs where the owners of living units lease directly to
tenants. Id at § 860.202. However, automatic rejection of unwed mothers and wel-
fare recipients from Section 8 projects is forbidden in the Housing Assistance Pay-
ments Contract that each Section 8 landlord must sign. HUD regulations also forbid
the use of residency requirements in subsidized housing. Id at §§ 880.603(b)(1),
881.603(b)(1) (1980). In Doe v. Charlotte Hous. Auth., No. C-C-78-0349 (D.N.C.
1978), the court extended McDougal to forbid PHA discrimination against mentally
retarded persons.
179. A number of public housing authorities faced severe cash flow problems in
the 1970's due to increased operating costs. See F. DELEECUW, OPERATING COSTS IN
PUBLIC HOUSING: A FINANCIAL Ciusis 8-112-11 (Urb. Inst. 1977). See also notes
188-93 and accompanying text infra.
180. For a discussion of "problem families," see L. Peattie, Social Issues in Hous-
ing (1966) (unpublished mimeograph in Massachusetts Institute of Technology Li-
brary of Architecture and Planning).
181. HUD regulations empower PHAs to implement tenant selection policies and
procedures that "preclude admission of applicants whose habits and practices reason-
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During the early years of the public housing program, many PHAs
automatically excluded all welfare recipients, thus effectively elimi-
nating the poorest potential tenants.1 82 While Congress eventually
forbade automatic exclusion of welfare recipients frompublic hous-
ing,a"I the judiciary had to settle the issue in the context of subsidized
housing. In 1968, a federal district court in New York in Colon v.
Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. 184 struck down a rule that automat-
ically excluded welfare recipients from a subsidized project.' 85 Four
years later, the Second Circuit reached the same result in Male v.
Crossroads Associates8 6 Both courts based their decisions on equal
protection grounds.' 87
Subsequent decisions have all but eliminated an applicant's wealth
as a criterion for selection to public housing. In Fletcher v. Housing
Authority ofLouisville,' 88 the Sixth Circuit reviewed HUD's so-called
"rent range formula"' 89 which favored public housing applicants ca-
pable of paying higher rents over other applicants.' 9 I The "rent
range formula" was HUD's response to threats of bankruptcy from a
number of housing authorities.'' HUD designed the formula to in-
crease PHAs' income by giving preference to wealthier tenants who
would pay more rent than would poorer potential tenants. The
Fletcher court used very broad language in holding that "tenant ad-
mission policies which discriminate against applicants because of
ably may be expected to have a detrimental effect on the tenants or the project envi-
ronment." 24 C.F.R. § 860.204(b) (1980).
182. See L. FRIEDMAN, GOVERNMENT AND SLUM HOUSING 109 (1968).
183. 63 Stat. 422 (1949). Although the provision was repealed, 75 Stat. 164 (1961),
in practice welfare recipients are freely accepted into big-city housing projects. See
also L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 182, at 109.
184. 294 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
185. Id at 138.
186. 469 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1972).
187. Id at 622 (state or its alter egos may not relegate welfare recipients to second
class citizenship solely because they receive welfare assistance); Colon v, Tompkins
Square Neighbors, Inc., 294 F. Supp. at 138 (where welfare recipient is reliable and
has successfully applied, rejection due to his receiving welfare funds is unconstitu-
tional arbitrary classification).
188. 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), reinstated, 525
F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1975).
189. Id at 795-97.
190. Id at 795.
191. Id at 796.
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their poverty are no longer justified" '192 despite the acknowledged
need of housing authorities to increase their rental income. Another
court subsequently adopted the Fletcher holding in the public hous-
ing context. 193
Courts have not applied these precedents in the context of subsi-
dized housing. Tenants in subsidized housing programs rarely chal-
lenged landlords' use of specific criteria to determine eligibility for
rental. One obvious reason for this dearth of cases is that Congress
and HUD have given subsidized housing landlords broad discretion
to choose their tenants. The statute states that "all. . .management
• ..responsibilities, including the selection of tenants . shall be
assumed by the owner."' 9' 4 Similarly, HUD's regulations clearly
grant the owner extremely broad discretion to select tenants. The
rules provide that the landlord must tell an applicant the reasons for
the rejection "(i)f the owner determines that an applicant is ineligible
on the basis of income or family composition, or that the owner is not
selecting the applicantfor other reasons .... "' (emphasis added).
This language implies that a landlord may reject an applicant for any
reason that is not unconstitutional, and at least two federal district
courts have explicitly so held. 196
192. Id at 804.
193. See Crawford v. Metropolitan Dev. & Hous. Auth., 415 F. Supp. 41, 47
(M.D. Tenn. 1976) (rent range system is inconsistent with National Housing Act and
constitutes an abuse of discretion). Cf. Bradley v. Housing Auth. of Kansas City,
Mo., 512 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 1975) (affirming lower court dismissal of suit by public
housing applicants challenging tenant selection preferences for higher-income appli-
cants after housing.authority gave plaintiffs apartments).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
195. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.603(b)(3), 881.603(b)(3) (1980).
196. Ressler v. Landrieu, 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska 1980). The court rejected
plaintiffs' claims that a Section 8 landlord's broad discretion to choose among eligible
applicants violated due process. Id at 328. See also Daubner v. Harris, 514 F. Supp.
856, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (rental policy constituted rational means to achieve legiti-
mate government goals of rehabilitating neighborhood, and preserving and strength-
ening city's unique place in the nation's cultural life).
While tenants rarely challenge landlords' use of specific criteria in subsidized
projects, two cases currently in litigation in Georgia deserve scrutiny. In Jenkins v.
Chatham Properties, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Ga. 1980), plaintiffs challenged de-
fendants' practice of automatically excluding applicants poor enough to be eligible for
utility payment subsidies in excess of their rent. Id (These so-called "negative rent"
payments are authorized at 24 C.F.R. § 880.604 (1980)). The court abruptly dis-
missed plaintiffs' claims at a preliminary injunction hearing, noting that "assuming
arguendo state action, defendants' conduct plausibly withstands a minimum scrutiny
analysis. The fiscal conservation aspect of the regulatory scheme may be construed as
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2. Section 8 Existing Housing
Substantial litigation has focused on the selection criteria housing
authorities have used in allocating Certificates of Family Participa-
tion. HUD requires that PHAs wishing to use criteria aside from the
applicants' income and family type must state these "additional" re-
quirements for eligibility or preferences, 197 and must receive HUD's
approval.198 These procedures have made it easier for potential ten-
ants of Section 8 existing housing to challenge specific eligibility cri-
teria than it was to dispute such standards in subsidized projects.
Two such "local requirements" that HUD recommends to local
PHAs have spurred most of the litigation. One criterion makes ineli-
gible for Certificates of Family Participation those applicants who
previously left the Section 8 existing housing program owing rent. 199
a legitimate state interest fostered by HUD to which the (owner subclassification) is
rationally related." 496 F. Supp. at 252.
Since the preliminary injunction hearing, the court has consolidated Jenkins with
the second case, Lambert v. Wainsboro Properties, Ltd., No. CV-181-071 (N.D. Ga.,
filed Mar. 25, 1981, transferred to southern district). Lambert involves the same land-
lord as in Jenkins, in the guise of a different limited partnership. Plaintiffs have chal-
lenged the landlord's practice of systematically choosing richer over poorer
applicants, regardless of their date of application. Plaintiffs' attorney says the land-
lord adopted its rule in an effort to comply with 24 C.F.R. § 880.40 (1980), requiring
Section 8 landlords to maintain a tenant population in their projects whose average
income was 40% of the area median income. Telephone interview with Ayres Gard-
ner, Attorney for Plaintiffs (Sept., 1981). This requirement was abolished in the 1981
Budget Reconciliation Act. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (95 Stat.) 530. In a potentially far-reach-
ing development, plaintiffs amended their complaint to ask the court to require HUD
to implement the Section 8 statute's requirement that people living in substandard
housing receive preference for Section 8 units. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e)(2) (1976 &
Supp. III 1979). Ms. Gardner says HUD told her it has not implemented the provi-
sion because of the difficulty in defining "substandard."
The author is grateful to Ms. Gardner for the information on Lambert she
provided.
197. HUD PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCY ADMINISTRATIVE HANDBOOK FOR THE
SECTION 8 EXISTING HOUSING PROGRAM (Nov., 1979) [hereinafter cited as HUD
HANDBOOK].. Preferences and requirements are the two basic types of admission cri-
teria. A preference gives an applicant with the preferred characteristic priority over an
applicant lacking the characteristics. Due to the fact that many more applicants qual-
ify for assisted housing compared to the number of available units, a preference might
be as effective as a requirement to bar applicants for assisted housing who lack the
preferred characteristic. 24 C.F.R. § 882.209 (1980).
198. HUD HANDBOOK, supra note 197, at 10.
199. Id In the public housing context, rejected applicants have successfully chal-
lenged this criterion as a violation of due process. See Lancaster v. Scranton Hous.
Auth., 479 F. Supp. 134 (M.D. Pa. 1979), af'd, 620 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1980).
[Vol. 23:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol23/iss1/2
TENANTS' RIGHTS IN ASSISTED HOUSING
The second criterion requires an applicant to the Section 8 existing
housing program to pay all rent owed from any previous tenure in
public housing.2" A number of PHAs have followed HUD's advice
and have adopted these two criteria,20 1 but disappointed applicants
have forced three of the authorities into federal court to defend the
practice. The courts have not reached a unanimous conclusion.
In Ferguson v. Metropolitan Development and Housing Authoriy,20 2
a federal district court held that the prior indebtedness criterion con-
stituted an unauthorized collection practice that "violates the stated
purpose of the statutes, regulations, and legislative history creating
the program.203 The court read the enabling statute as "creat(ing)
very specific eligibility criteria clearly intended to limit the discretion
of the PHA in determining who may participate in the program." 2°4
The court quotes language in the annual contribution contract (ACC)
between HUD and the PHA,2"5 which provides that "(n)o person
shall automatically be excluded. . . because of membershop in a class
such as unmarried mothers, recipients of public assistance, etc.,"2 6 as
well as language providing that PHA's shall use ACCs "solely for the
purpose of providing decent, safe and sanitary dwellings" (emphasis
added)."0 This language is used to support the court's holding,
which seems to be that PHA's cannot use any criteria for choosing
applicants other than the family size and income criteria provided by
statute.
The Ferguson court's reasoning is open to question. The court fails
to mention that the drafters of the ACC probably intended the cited
language to incorporate the law developed in the cases forbidding
automatic rejection of welfare recipients and unmarried mothers.20 8
200. HUD HANDBOOK, supra note 197, at 10.
201. See notes 202-24 and accompanying text infra.
202. 485 F. Supp. 517 (M.D. Tenn. 1980). Ferguson's precedential value was un-
dercut by the Sixth Circuit's affirmance of Baker v. Cincinnati Hous. Auth., No. 80-
3441 (6th Cir. Apr. 20, 1982). See note 224a infra.
203. Id at 524.
204. Id
205. Id at 525. The ACC is the written agreement between HUD and PHAs that
sets forth the federal assistance the PHA receives to make housing assistance pay-
ments and to cover other program expenses. 24 C.F.R. § 882.102 (1980). For further
regulations involving the ACC, see id at §§ 882.104, 882.107.
206. 485 F. Supp. at 525 (emphasis added).
207. Id
208. See notes 170-87 and accompanying text supra.
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The court instead reads the provision as proof that the discretion of
housing authorities to select tenants is "narrow indeed."20 9
Not surprisingly, other courts reached conclusions contrary to Fer-
guson in reviewing the prior indebtedness criterion for selecting Sec-
tion 8 existing housing applicants. In Baker v. Cincinnati
Metropolitan HousingAuthority,210 a federal district court in Ohio re-
lied heavily on the opinion of HUD's regional counsel to find that the
statute justified automatic rejection of applicants who had left public
housing owing rent and have not paid the amount owed.2 1' It
adopted the regional counsel's conclusion that the criterion was con-
sistent with the program's goals of encouraging assisted families to
pay their rent.212 The court also dismissed somewhat abruptly the
plaintiffs' series of constitutional arguments.213 While finding state
action present, the court held the selection criterion did not violate
the equal protection clause because HUD had a rational basis for its
policy of excluding public housing tenants with rent arrearages (to
encourage payment of rent and to save money).21 4 Moreover, in a
striking jumble of constitutional scholarship, the court held that the
criterion did not constitute an irrebuttable presumption because the
guideline entitled rejected applicants to a due process hearing.2 15 Fi-
nally, the court also rejected the plaintiffs' two due process claims:
first, that the housing authority's failure to publish its rent arrearage
209. 485 F. Supp. at 525. The court also said the prior-indebtedness criterion
"circumvents the procedures and protections" that state law provides to both land-
lords and tenants. Id at 526. Finally, the court cites Fletcher v. Housing Auth. of
Louisville, 491 F.2d 793 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated, 419 U.S. 812 (1974), reinstated, 525
F.2d 532 (6th cir. 1975), to support its contention that the PHA acted improperly. 485
F. Supp. at 526. Fletcher is analogous to Ferguson in that the court forbade housing
authorities from using HUD-recommended criteria to cut costs. See notes 188-92 and
accompanying text supra.
210. 490 F. Supp. 520 (S.D. Ohio 1980), af'd No. 80-3441 (6th Cir. April 20,
1982). In a case decided after the Urban Law Annual had gone to press, another
district court upheld the prior indebtedness criterion, citing Baker and Vandermark
and distinguishing Ferguson. Kohl v. Housing Auth. of Bloomington, No. 80-3243
.(C.D. Ill. May 3, 1982).
211. Id at 527-28. The court rejected plaintiffs' reliance on the opinion of HUD's
Boston counsel who determined that the PHA could not refuse to certify tenants who
left public housing owing rent until they paid both rent arrearages and the landlord's
attorney fees, and terminated all litigation on the matter. Id at 528, n.58.
212. 490 F. Supp. at 528.
213. Id at 528-33.
214. Id at 529.
215. Id at 530.
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policy constituted a failure to provide adequate standards;216 and sec-
ond, that the post-denial hearing was inadequate. 21
7
In Vandermark v. Housing Authority of York,2" 8 a federal district
court in Pennsylvania also upheld the criterion of rejecting applicants
who owe past rent.2 9 In contrast to Baker, however, Vandermark
reached the same conclusion with almost unseemly ease. It found
power for the criterion in statutory language that gives housing au-
thorities the right to formulate preferences.220 The court said the
statute vests the maximum amount of authority with the local public
agencies, 22' and requires "sound and efficient management programs
and practices to assure rental collection." 222 Next, the court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' rather creative argument that the housing au-
thority's policy constituted rulemaking, and that HUD had
promulgated the rule without complying with the Administrative
Procedure Act.223 Finally, the court summarily dismissed the plain-
tiffs' equal protection and substantive due process arguments.224
After these decisions, particularly Ferguson and Baker, the out-
come of direct challenges to the prior indebtedness criterion in the
Section 8 existing housing context seems uncertain.224a Whereas ap-
plicants to subsidized housing projects had no legal basis to directly
attack the prior indebtedness criterion, courts that follow Ferguson
now may make direct challenges more appealing by narrowly limit-
ing the guidelines housing authorities may use to select tenants. Con-
216. Id
217. Id at 531-33. The trial court's decision was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit,
No. 80-3441, Apr. 20, 1982, in an opinion that cites the Third Circuit's decision in
Vandermark v. Housing Auth. of York, 663 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1981).
218. 492 F. Supp. 359 (M.D. Pa. 1980), aft'd, 663 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1981). In
affirming the district court, the Third Circuit distinguished Ferguson, but in so doing,
misstated the Ferguson conclusion. Id at 440, n.2.




223. Id at 362-63.
224. Id at 363-64.
224a. Events subsequent to the URBAN LAW ANNUAL'S press date indicate a
strong trend towards upholding the prior indebtedness criterion. The Sixth Circuit's
affirmance of Baker (although the Baker court did not explicitly mention Ferguson)
presumably overrules Ferguson, since the Ferguson court is within the Sixth Circuit's
jurisdiction. In addition, a third case upholding the prior indebtedness criterion was
decided, Kohl v. Housing Auth. of Bloomington, No. 80-3243 (C.D. Ill. May 3, 1982).
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versely, these plaintiffs would probably fail when presenting a direct
challenge in a jurisdiction adopting Baker. Courts using the Baker
approach will provide housing authorities broad power to establish
criteria for selecting applicants.
D. Do Section 8 Existing Housing Applicants Have More or Fewer
Rights Than Other Assisted Housing Tenants?
The preceding survey of case law demonstrates that applicants to
public housing clearly have more procedural rights than do appli-
cants to subsidized housing projects. The Second Circuit's decision in
Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority225 requires public hous-
ing authorities to employ due process procedures when processing the
applications of would-be tenants. 226 HUD regulations adopted sub-
sequent to Davis and Neddo require housing authorities to provide
informal hearings to rejected applicants, 227 and Fletcher and its prog-
eny forbid housing authorities from giving preference to richer over
poorer applicants. 228
Conversely, while subsidized housing landlords must follow cer-
tain basic Holmes-type procedures when processing applications, 229
they need only offer minimal due process "interviews" to rejected ap-
plicants.23 ° Subsidized landlords may also have greater leeway to use
an applicant's income to screen out poor people whom they consider
undesirable.231
By comparison, the relative position of applicants to Section 8 ex-
isting housing is not entirely clear. The results of pending litiga-
tion232 will help to resolve the issues, but one important factor can
already be identified: the scope of procedural protection will most
likely depend on which tier of the admission process is involved. On
the upper level of activity, where housing authorities process applica-
tions for Certificates of Family Participation,233 the rights of appli-
cants will probably resemble more closely the expanded rights of
225. 398 F.2d 262 (2d Cir. 1968).
226. See notes 91-99 and accompanying text supra.
227. 24 C.F.R. § 860.207 (a) (1980).
228. See notes 188-93 and accompanying text supra.
229. See notes 100-14 and accompanying text supra.
230. See notes 141-42 and accompanying text supra.
231. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.603(b)(3), 881.603(b)(3) (1980). See note 196 supra.
232. See note 224a supra.
233. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
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public housing tenants. Several courts have held that Section 8 ex-
isting housing applicants are entitled to due process hearings if they
are denied Certificates of if their Certificates are terminated.2 34  In
addition, the court in Solomon v. New York City Housing Authority
235
required the housing authority to provide Holmes-type procedures
when processing applications for the Certificates. Finally, the Fergu-
son court held that housing authorities cannot use an applicant's
prior indebtedness to deny Certificates,236 although Baker and Van-
dermark make it unclear whether that holding will prevail as
precedent.237
In sharp contrast, potential tenants under the Section 8 existing
housing program have virtually no procedural protection when they
apply for a specific apartment. 238 These tenants' dealings with pri-
vate landlords do not involve state action,239 so that landlords do not
have to follow Holmes' processing procedures, and rejected appli-
cants are not entitled to due process hearings. Moreover, HUD's ef-
forts to limit landlord discretion to reject automatically certain
groups of people seem very muchproforma.24 ° Thus, once they ac-
tually look for housing, Section 8 existing housing prospective ten-
ants have fewer rights than even prospective tenants of subsidized
housing projects.
On balance, prospective tenants of Section 8 existing housing have
234. See notes 148-59 and accompanying text supra.
235. No. 79 Civ. 3591 (S.D.N.Y., June 24, 1981).
236. See notes 202-07 and accompanying text supra.
237. See notes 210-24 and accompanying text supra.
238. As discussed previously, certified applicants apparently have not sued to de-
mand Holmes-type procedures from private landlords who reject their applications.
See also note 147 and accompanying text supra.
239. See notes 78, 89-90, and accompanying text supra.
240. HUD says it has never exercised sanctions against an existing housing land-
lord for discrimination. Telephone interview with Stephen Balis, HUD General
Counsel for the Section 8 existing housing program, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 12,
1981). One reason for this, however, may be that the sanction against a discrimina-
tory landlord would be to cut off the landlord's subsidy. This would produce the
ironic result of blocking discrimination by eliminating the aggrieved tenant's land-
lord, and thus the tenant, from the program. In view of the lack of anti-discrimina-
tion enforcement procedures, some groups (notably single parents) not surprisingly
have difficulty finding landlords who will rent to them. According to HUD statistics,
over three-fourths of single-parent households and over 50% of all minority house-
holds with Certificates of Family Participation fail to find an apartment within 60
days, the maximum search time that the regulations allow. Housing Affairs, Feb. 5,
1982, at 6-7.
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less effective protection than do applicants to either public or subsi-
dized housing projects. The full range of protections these applicants
enjoy on the upper tier of activity offers little concrete benefit if a
potential tenant cannot convert a Certificate of Family Participation
into a dwelling unit. Yet, on this second level of activity, the Section
8 existing housing program offers a prospective tenant virtually no
protection when dealing with landlords who refuse to rent. Closely
related policy and legal reasons help to explain this situation. If
courts were to impose upon these landlords a mandate to afford re-
jected applicants procedural and substantive protections, and to re-
quire landlords to explain their actions, all private landlords would
face the same rules because any landlord is a prospective Section 8
existing housing landlord. As a policy matter, courts are not pre-
pared to make such demands of landlords. As a legal question, the
absence of state action precludes due process claims against private
parties.
The case law lessons involving admissions to Section 8 existing
housing are relevant to any future housing voucher program. If the
Reagan administration follows through on its early signals to fashion
a voucher scheme after the Section 8 existing housing program,
2 41
tenants will enjoy fewer procedural and substantive protections than
did applicants to the older production programs.
IV. CASE LAW ON EVICTIONS FROM SECTION 8 EXISTING
HOUSING IN THE CONTEXT OF PRIOR ASSISTED
HOUSING CASES
A. Overview
The controversy over evictions from assisted housing has been
more vehement and more focused than that over admissions proce-
dures. Several reasons explain why assisted housing tenants
threatened by eviction have filed far more lawsuits than have disap-
pointed applicants. The first, and most obvious reason, is that a fam-
ily facing eviction is more likely to retain an attorney than is a family
disappointed because it was denied assisted housing. Second, ten-
ants' attorneys have placed more emphasis on eviction cases.24 2 In
addition to their concern for the human consequences facing a family
241. See notes 64-69 and accompanying text supra.
242. Telephone interview with David Bryson, attorney for the National Housing
Law Project, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept., 1981).
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threatened with eviction, a number of tenants' attorneys have re-
ceived reports of Section 8 existing housing landlords demanding
payments from tenants "under the table."243 These payoffs are in
addition to the fair market rent that the tenant pays with the help of a
federal subsidy.2" Tenants' attorneys experienced in this type of liti-
gation believe that without due process procedures that require a
landlord to prove good cause to evict a Section 8 existing housing
tenant, unscrupulous landlords would find it easier to evict tenants
who refused to supply payoffs.245
All parties to assisted housing programs agree that procedures for
eviction are vitally important. As is to be expected, however, they
disagree on the necessary scope of that protection. Landlords argue
that if they must become involved in lengthy, expensive due process
hearings prior to evicting a "deadbeat", disruptive tenant, the success
of an entire project can be jeopardized. In a vehement expression of
landlords' concerns, authors J.S. Fuerst and Roy Petty wrote in 1977:
No one would argue that the courts should deny due process
rights to public housing tenants. In the rarefied and polite at-
mosphere of a federal courtroom, it seems the essence of justice
that a tenant accused of antisocial behavior be given every op-
portunity to defend himself and avoid unfair sanctions; but, try
explaining that to a group of worried tenants, anxious to evict
one of their neighbors because he or his family threatens to harm
their families, or makes their lives otherwise dangerous or
unpleasant.
One point all these cases overlook is the fact that public housing
managers seek evictions only as an absolute last resort. Turno-
ver is high enough in most projects without adding to it by un-
necessary evictions; managers would prefer never having to evict
anyone, and generally do so only when all other possible solu-
tions have been exhausted. Housing managers know from expe-
rience that several disruptive tenants can empty out a whole
floor of decent, responsible tenants-people who would rather
take their chances on the private housing market than live amid
squalid or dangerous conditions. A few delayed evictions can
wreck an entire project, leaving the authority with none but
problem families as willing tenants. Anyone who has seen these
projects knows that they are little more than family prisons, and
243. Id
244. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
245. Telephone interview with David Bryson, attorney for the National Housing
Law Project, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept., 1981).
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it is hard to believe the European almshouses of the eighteenth
century could have been any worse.2 46
Given the unanimity of opinion that assisted housing tenants have
a right to procedural due process, the relevant cases concerning evic-
tions have centered on the question of scope. As in the admissions
context, the earliest cases concerned public housing tenants, focusing
on whether their right to public housing was a property right for four-
teenth amendment purposes.247 Later cases involving the rights of
subsidized housing tenants assume the existence of a property right,
and explore the question of whether subsidized housing landlords'
activities involved state action.248 Most courts have ultimately found
state action present, guaranteeing due process protections for tenants
facing evictions from subsidized housing projects. 249 The courts,
however, used a double standard (as they did in the admissions con-
text)25° to decide how much process subsidized tenants as opposed to
public housing tenants should receive. They required housing au-
thorities to offer public housing tenants fairly formal due process
hearings,251 but tended to ratify minimal due process procedures
prior to evicting tenants from subsidized projects. 252
246. Fuerst & Petty, supra note 4, at 503.
247. See, e.g., Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F. 2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (privilege or right to occupy publicly subsi-
dized, low-rent housing is no less entitled to due process protection than other recog-
nized rights and privileges); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853,
861 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (government cannot deprive pri-
vate citizen of continued tenancy without affording him adequate procedural safe-
guards). Tenants' attorneys have sought a requirement of pre-eviction due process
since Thorpe v. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 386 U.S. 670 (1967).
248. See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1973) (private land-
lord operating with county authorization and federal participation is sufficient state
involvement to constitute state action for purposes of fourteenth amendment); Mc-
Queen v. Druker, 317 F..Supp. 1122, 1128 (D. Mass. 1970), aj'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st
Cir. 1971) (federal and state power, property, and prestige invested in landlord's au-
thority over tenants places these actions within the scope of fifth and fourteenth
amendments).
249. Id See notes 285-92 and accompanying text infra.
250. See notes 91-109, 140-41, 167-96, and accompanying text supra.
251. See notes 303-07 and accompanying text infra.
252. See notes 308-10 and accompanying text infra. Housing authorities must
offer fairly formal pre-eviction administrative hearings. See 24 C.F.R. § 866.58
(1980). In most jurisdictions, however, subsidized landlords need only prove good
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These relatively straightforward standards for public housing and
subsidized projects did not work efficiently when courts sought to ap-
ply them in the Section 8 existing housing program. Considerable
controversy has surrounded the question of what procedures a land-
lord must afford to tenants threatened with eviction from a Section 8
existing housing unit. In the admissions context, the housing authori-
ties' role in allocating Certificates of Family Participation (which
clearly involves state action) and the landlords' decision to agree or
refuse to rent to a particular tenant (which presumably does not)
were easily distinguishable.253 This simple division fails in the evic-
tions context, where either the housing authority or the landlord, but
not both, must take the lead in evicting a tenant from his
apartment. 254
Not surprisingly, pro-tenant forces wanted housing authorities, not
private landlords, to be responsible for evictions of Section 8 existing
housing tenants.255 This would ensure the presence of state action,
and so would guarantee tenants full due process rights.256 Congress
eventually accepted this position, writing into the Section 8 existing
housing statute a requirement that housing authorities send all evic-
tion notices. 7 Tenants' lawyers then turned to defining the scope of
tenants' due process rights. Three separate questions developed:
first, must the tenant receive a prior administrative hearing, or can
due process requirements be satisfied during the state court eviction
proceeding?258 Second, does due process require that a landlord
253. See notes 147-59 and accompanying text supra.
254. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1980).
255. Telephone interview with Cushing Dolbeare, President and Executive Direc-
tor, National Low-Income Housing Coalition, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 12, 1982).
256. See notes 78, 91-99, 127-39, 247-52, 304-07 and accompanying text.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976). HUD initially tried to evade due process
requirements by giving housing authorities a minor, passive role, and shifting primary
responsibility for eviction to the private landlords, 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1978). Ten-
ants' lawyers successfully challenged this arrangement as a violation of the statute.
See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 618 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (HUD regulation fatally conflicts with statute); Swann v. Gastonia Hous. Auth.,
502 F. Supp. 362, 366 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (Congress gave public housing agency sole
right to issue notice to vacate order to protect tenants' rights in eviction); Brown v.
Harris, 491 F. Supp. 845, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (regulation giving owner authority to
issue order to vacate is contrary to clear and definite words of the statute). Both
.1orries, No. 81-7389 (11th Cir. June 14, 1982) and Swann, No. 81-1439 (4th Cir. Apr.
8, 1982) were subsequently affirmed.
258. See notes 303-13 and accompanying text infra.
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prove "good cause" before eviction may proceed?2" 9 Third, does the
"good cause" standard apply to lease nonrenewals as well as to mid-
term evictions? 26
0
Three federal cases have addressed these issues, and tenants have
prevailed in two of the cases. In Jefries v. Georgia Residential Fi-
nance Authority,26, and Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority,262 dif-
ferent courts closely followed the case law developed in subsidized
housing cases.263 Together, Jeffries and Swann established: (1) that
landlords must show good cause prior to a mid-term eviction;264
(2) that a landlord may not refuse to renew a lease absent a showing
of good cause;265 and (3) that good cause in either situation may be
proven in the state court eviction proceeding, making unnecessary a
separate administrative hearing.2 66 In a third, unpublished decision,
a federal district court in Kentucky reached different conclusions. In
Cain v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 67 the
court distinguished prior case law and held that tenants facing evic-
259. See notes 314-35 and accompanying text infra.
260. Id Two cases have discussed a fourth possible question. In Gennaro v. Jonas
Equities, Inc., No. C4-80-2258 (E.D.N.Y., Jan. 5, 1981), a private landlord allegedly
punished a tenant for her participation in tenants' rights activities by refusing to ac-
cept Section 8 funding to further subsidize her apartment. The tenant argued that the
landlord had to accept the subsidy. The court dismissed the suit for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, holding that HUD had no authority to force a landlord to con-
tinue to accept the subsidy. Background on Gennaro was obtained in an interview
with Herbert Levy, HUD Associate Regional Counsel, in New York City (Feb. 12,
1982). But see Tann Realty Co. v. Thompson (N.Y. Civil Ct., Kings County, Sept. 30,
1981), reportedin 9 HDR #20 (Oct. 12, 1981) (landlord must continue Section 8 bene-
fits in its renewal lease if the expiring lease entitled the tenant to Section 8 subsidy).
For a similar holding in the context of the Section 8 set aside program, see Ressler v.
Landrieu, 502 F. Supp. 324 (D. Alaska 1980).
261. 503 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ga. 1980), af'd, No. 81-7389 (11th Cir., June 14,
1982).
262. 502 F. Supp. 362 (N.D. N.C. 1980), aff'd, No. 81-1439 (4th Cir., Apr. 8,
1982).
263. See notes 285-92 and accompanying text infra.
264. 503 F. Supp. at 617.
265. 502 F. Supp. at 364, aj'd, No. 81-1439 (4th Cir., Apr. 8, 1982). Unlike the
trial court in Jeffries, which based its good cause finding exclusively on constitutional
grounds, the Swann trial court opinion cited statutory as well as constitutional
grounds. The 4th Circuit's Swann opinion bases its good cause finding solely on statu-
tory grounds..
266. 503 F. Supp. at 621. The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Swann reverses an un-
published trial court order that required a pre-eviction administrative hearing.
267. No. 70-178 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 19, 1980).
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tion do not have due process protections because 1) they do not have
a protected property interest, and 2) a private landlord's decision is
not state action.268
The favorable decision in Cain did not end HUD's concerns that
Swann and Jeifries ultimately would prevail as precedent, thus assur-
ing that tenants would receive due process prior to eviction. After
President Reagan's election, HUD proposed statutory language (that
the Senate, but not the House adopted) designed to enact into law the
agency's contention that Section 8 existing housing tenants have a
property interest only in their Certificates of Family Participation,
not in their apartments.269 Thus, tenants would have absolutely no
due process rights if their landlords sought to evict them. Congress
eventually rejected this notion, adopting instead language that gives
such tenants pre-eviction due process protections similar to those
available to other assisted housing tenants.27°
The remainder of this section elaborates the law on evictions from
Section 8 existing housing in the context of prior assisted housing
cases. It begins with a discussion of the case law on evictions of Sec-
tion 8 existing housing tenants. 27' The section then evaluates new
statutory provisions that affect tenant pre-eviction rights.
272
B. Case Law Issues
1. Does Due Process Apply When Existing Housing Tenants Are
Evicted?
The Section 8 existing housing program statute requires the public
housing authority, not the private landlord, to send eviction notices
to tenants.273 Since its inception, HUD and many PHAs have dis-
268. Id
269. See notes 336-38 and accompanying text infra.
270. See note 342 and accompanying text infra.
271. See notes 273-335 and accompanying text infra.
272. See notes 336-42 and accompanying text infra.
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976), as amendedby Omnibus Budget Reconcil-
iation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (95 Stat.)
357. This requirement originated in the federal government's older Section 23 leased
housing program. See note 44 supra. When the Nixon administration introduced the
Section 8 program in 1973, it encompassed only the new construction and substantial
rehabilitation program. The Section 8 existing housing program emerged during the
legislative process, and perhaps as an aside, Congress adopted the old Section 23 re-
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liked this requirement.274 Some PHAs do not want to send out evic-
tion notices275 because their counsel believe that once PHAs take
such action, courts will require them to give tenants pre-eviction due
process hearings similar to those that public housing tenants re-
ceive.2 76 HUD and other housing authorities not only oppose any
requirement that housing authorities send eviction notices; they also
oppose giving Section 8 existing housing tenants any due process pro-
tection.277 They argue that private landlords will not participate in
the program if procedural requirements constrain their ability to
evict.278 Their legal argument for this position is that a tenant's prop-
erty interest for due process purposes is in the Certificate of Family
Participation, not the apartment.279 Thus, they argue that a tenant
having no property interest in the dwelling unit has no due process
rights if evicted.280
HUD's reaction to Congress' distasteful requirement that PHAs
send eviction notices was to draft a regulation that essentially evaded
the requirement.281 HUD's regulation allowed landlords to send
eviction notices, provided that the local PHA had twenty days to veto
the eviction.282 Tenants suddenly facing the loss of procedural pro-
tection in eviction actions moved quickly to challenge HUD's rule.283
The analysis of the many cases284 filed to challenge this regulation
quirement that effectively gave Section 8 existing housing tenants more procedural
protection than tenants had in the production-type projects.
274. Telephone interview with Cushing Dolbeare, President and Executive Direc-
tor, National Low Income Housing Coalition, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 12, 1982).
275. Telephone interview with Richard Y. Nelson, Jr., Deputy Executive Director
National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials ("NAHRO") (July 1,
1981). Mr. Nelson said that PHAs believe they should not have to send eviction no-
tices because it is the individual landlords-not PHAs-who are evicting the tenants
involved.
276. See notes 303-07 and accompanying text infra.
277. HUD made this position clear in 1981. See note 337 and accompanying text
infra.
278. Telephone interview with HUD attorney, in Washington, D.C. (July 1,
1981).
279. HUD made this argument in Cain v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Hous. Auth., No. 78-179 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 19, 1980).
280. Id
281. 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1980).
282. Id
283. See note 284 and accompanying text infra.
284. See, e.g., Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 618
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must begin with the extensive case law on evictions that developed
after the federal district court holding in Mc Queen v. Druker.2 s5 Mc-
Queen held that a tenant in a subsidized housing project had the
right to due process prior to eviction.286 Other courts did not immedi-
ately accept this holding. The First Circuit eventually affirmed the
lower court's decision,287 but carefully avoided resting its decision on
due process grounds.288 Two other circuits subsequently held that
tenants have no due process rights prior to eviction from subsidized
housing projects because the program does not involve state ac-
tion.289 In 1973, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Joy . Daniels2 90 re-
versed this trend and held that assisted housing tenants were entitled
to due process.29' Courts have subsequently cited Joy to support
consistent holdings that state action is present in subsidized housing
cases and HUD regulations provide tenants with due process
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (HUD regulation fatally confficts with statute); Swann v. Gastonia
Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 366 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (legislative history 9f Low In-
come Housing Act states that Congress gave the PHA sole right to issue notice to
vacate order to protect tenant in eviction proceedings); Brown v. Harris, 491 F. Supp.
845, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (conflict between statute and the implementing regulation is
apparent, and rule is contrary to the statute's clear and definite words). In addition,
many cases filed to challenge the HUD rule never resulted in final decisions. See
Riebe v. Landrieu, No. 3-80-112 (D. Minn., filed May 16, 1980); Hutchinson v. Edger-
ton Highlands, No. 3-80-133 (D. Minn., filed Apr. 14, 1980); Simons v. Harris, No. 79-
0691-LHB (N.D. Cal., filed Mar. 21, 1979); Melville v. Coos-Curry Hous. Auth., No.
78-979 (D. Ore., filed Oct., 1978); Haas v. Newport Hous. Auth., No. 79-CI-158 (Ky.,
filed Apr. 18, 1979). Jeffries, No. 81-7389 (11th Cir. June 14, 1982) and Swann, No.
81-1439 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1982) were subsequently affirmed.
285. 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1979), aft'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
286. Id at 1129.
287. 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971).
288. Id at 784-85.
289. See Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473 F.2d 545, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1973) (state
action does not extend to a federally financed but privately owned apartment house
merely because state assesses real estate taxes at a lower rate); McGuane v. Chenango
Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971)
(granting tenant in subsidized housing pre-eviction hearing would be altogether far
too-reaching); Contra McLellan v. University Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374, 382
(D.R.I. 1972) (sufficient government involvement with landlord justifies application
of fourteenth amendment principles).
290. 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973).
291. In Joy, the Court held that the participation of the federal government
through its funding mechanism, and the use of state eviction proceedings, combined
to create state action affording the tenants the right to procedural due process. Id at
'1239.
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protections. 292
HUD acceded to the judicial trend in 1976, changing its regula-
tions to require due process for tenants prior to eviction from subsi-
dized projects. 293 HUD, however, continued to resist changing its
regulation requiring the landlord, rather than the PHA, to send evic-
tion notices to Section 8 existing housing tenants.294 In 1980, how-
ever, three federal district courts struck down this regulation as a
violation of the statute.295 In late 1980, HUD proposed a new regula-
tion designed to conform to the statute as the courts interpreted it.296
The proposed rule, requiring housing authorities to send all eviction
292. See Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federated Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d
483, 487 (9th Cir. 1974) (sufficient government involvement in subsidized housing
program subjects landlords to fifth amendment); Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South,
Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 942 (2d Cir. 1974) (private redevelopment company subject to
same due process requirements as municipal authority); Short v. Fulton Redevelop-
ment Co., 390 F. Supp. 517, 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (involvement of three levels of gov-
emnment in two housing projects is sufficient to constitute state action under the
fourteenth amendment); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (W.D. Va.
1973) (state approval of rent subsidies, and defendants' use of state eviction proce-
dures are state action); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal. App.3d 7, 16-17, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336,
342 (1974) (federally assisted but privately owned housing project is not immune from
procedural due process requirements in eviction). Contra Flamm v. Real-Blt, Inc.,
168 Mont. 351, 355, 543 F.2d 190, 192 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941 (1976) (receipt
of federal benefits in the form of mortgage insurance and rent supplements under
subsidized housing program statute does not make private corporation a state or fed-
eral agency for due process purposes).
293. 24 C.F.R. § 450 (1976). Although HUD specifically excluded Section 8
projects from the new regulation, in 1979 the agency eventually gave tenants in these
production projects the same protection. Id at §§ 880.607, 881.607 (1980).
294. 24 C.F.R. § 882.215 (1980).
295. See Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Auth., 503 F. Supp. 610, 618
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (HUD resolution fatally conflicts with statute); Swam v. Gastonia
Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362, 366 (W.D.N.C. 1980), afd, No. 81-1439, (legislative
history of Low Income Housing Act states that Congress gave the PHA sole right to
issue notice to vacate order to protect tenant in eviction proceedings); Brown v. Har-
ris, 491 F. Supp. 845, 847 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (conflict between statute and the imple-
menting regulation is apparent, and rule is contrary to the statute's clear and definite
words). Jeries, No. 81-7389 (1 Ith Cir. June 14, 1982) and Swann, No. 81-1439 (4th
Cir. Apr. 8, 1982) were subsequently affirmed.
296. HUD originally proposed a new rule designed to incorporate the court's in-
terpretations of the statute. See 45 Fed. Reg. 72697 (1980). Later, the agency aban-
doned the rule, opting instead to attempt to change the Section 8 enabling statute to
preclude the need for PHAs to send eviction notices by limiting tenants' entitlement
to their certificates and excluding their apartments. See Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
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notices, 29 7 pleased neither housing authorities (who opposed per-
forming this duty) not tenants' lawyers (who wanted full due process
procedures). 29 8 HUD never finalized the rule, evidently deciding to
avoid the need for it by changing the Section 8 enabling statute.
2. What Process is Due? Good Cause Requirement and the
Forum for Proving It.
The earliest eviction cases, involving public housing, focused on
the specific procedures courts required when PHAs held pre-eviction
due process hearings.299 Later, however, in the subsidized housing
context, the private landlord replaced the governmental actor (the
PHA) formerly available to provide due process hearings.3°° The
courts solved the problem that this situation presented by redefining
due process requirements. Instead of defining due process as a spe-
cific set of procedures in a pre-eviction administrative hearing, as
courts had done in the public housing context, they defined due pro-
cess as a standard of proof.3 01 A subsidized landlord satisfied due
process requirements upon proving good cause to evict.302 This solu-
tion still left unanswered the question of which forum the landlord
could use to prove good cause. Both issues are discussed below.
a. Can good cause be proved in a state eviction proceeding, or is a
prior administrative hearing required?
Tenants' lawyers ordinarily ask courts to require landlords to
prove good cause in an administrative hearing prior to the time the
eviction notice is sent.3"3 In public housing cases, courts have
granted this request. In Escalera v. New York City Housing Author-
ity,304 and Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority,30 5 courts required
PHAs to hold fairly formal due process hearings.30 6 The public
297. 45 Fed. Reg. at 72697.
298. Telephone interview with HUD attorney, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 4,
1982).
299. See notes 247, 251, 303-07 and accompanying text supra.
300. See notes 248, 252, 308-10 and accompanying text supra.
301. See notes 303-10, 314-16 and accompanying text infra.
302. See notes 308-10 and accompanying text infra.
303. See notes 304-07 and accompanying text infra.
304. 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
305. 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1003 (1971).
306. Id at 1004, 425 F.2d at 863.
1982]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
housing cases tend to focus on whether the specific procedures uti-
lized in an individual hearing were close enough to those required in
a full-blown evidentiary hearing to fulfill due process
requirements. 30
7
Courts have once again applied a double standard to PHAs and
subsidized housing landlords, 308 holding PHAs to a much higher
level of due process than "private" landlords of subsidized projects.
Most courts in subsidized housing cases have not required landlords
to hold separate administrative due process hearings. 30 9 Instead,
courts generally have held that such landlords may satisfy due pro-
cess (as a matter of federal constitutional law) by providing good
cause in state court eviction proceedings.310
307. 433 F.2d at 1002; 425 F.2d at 862-63.
308. See notes 108-09 (processing applications for assisted housing), 140-45 (pro-
cedures for rejecting applications), and 194-196 (use of selection criteria) and accom-
panying text supra.
309. Numerous courts have held that subsidized landlords need not hold adminis-
trative hearings prior to eviction if a landlord can subsequently prove good cause at
an eviction proceeding. See Lopez v. Henry Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937,
946 (2d Cir. 1974) (private landlord entitled to serve eviction notice need not provide
a further hearing because of improved conduct during the period consumed by the
hearing and federal court proceeding); Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1243 (4th Cir.
1973) (prior administrative hearing is unnecessary, provided the tenant at some point
receives a plenary judicial hearing); Anderson v. Denny, 365 F. Supp. 1254, 1261
(W.D. Va. 1973) (state court proceedings are sufficient to provide a constitutionally
adequate means of affording due process of law); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp.
1122, 1131 (D. Mass. 1970), at'd, 438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) (state court provision
for eviction hearing negates requiring any other opportunity); Appel v. Beyer, 39 Cal.
App. 3d 7, 19, 114 Cal. Rptr. 336, 344 (1974) (administrative type procedures that
avoid judicial hearings are not always accepted); Green v. Copperstone Ltd. Partner-
ship, 28 Md. App. 498, 517, 346 A.2d 686, 697 (1975) (due process permits use of
state's summary statutory eviction procedures of private project is determining factor
requiring fundamental fairness to intended beneficiaries); Tompkins Square Neigh-
bors, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 68 Misc. 2d 103, 104, 326 N.Y.S. 2d 665, 666 (1971) (adminis-
trative hearing required prior to eviction of tenant from state-financed redevelopment
project); modfledinpart, 68 Misc. 2d 955, 328 N.Y.S.2d 262 (1972); supplemented, 69
Misc. 2d 301, 329 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1972); moded, 73 Misc. 2d 126, 341 N.Y.S.2d 627
(1973); rev'd, 43 A.D.2d 551, 349 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1973); appeal dismissed, 34 N.Y.2d
737, 313 N.E.2d 790, 357 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1974). See also Henry Knox Sherrill Corp. v.
Randall, 33 Conn. Supp. 15, 17-18, 358 A.2d 154, 156 (1975) (panoply of governmen-
tal assistance and regulation is sufficient to find landlord's activities are state action).
310. In a few cases, courts have rejected the double standard and required land-
lords of subsidized projects to hold separate administrative hearings. Most of these
decisions are in the New York State courts. New York courts seem less intimidated
by imposing the burden of an administrative hearing on subsidized landlords because
many private landlords in New York City are required to prove good cause to evict
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This double standard has also applied to Section 8 existing housing
eviction cases. PHAs had feared that if they sent out eviction notices
to tenants, courts would follow the case law that required them to
offer pre-eviction, administrative hearings.31' The one opinion that
addressed the issue prior to the time it was resolved by statute in 1981
should have eased this concern. In Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Fi-
nance Authority,312 a federal district court in Georgia held that while
PHAs must send eviction notices, they need not provide pre-eviction
administrative hearings.313
any tenant from a rent-controlled apartment. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 8585-2
(1974). See Fuller v. Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 318, 270 N.E.2d 321, 323, 321 N.Y.S.2d
601, 603 (1971) (state agency must give Mitchell-Lama tenants a "limited hearing"
prior to eviction); Bonner v. Park Lake Hous. Dev. Fund Corp., 70 Misc. 2d 325, 329,
333 N.Y.S.2d 277, 281 (1972) (landlord of Section 236 project required to offer pre-
eviction hearing); Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 68 Misc. 2d 103,
106,326 N.Y.S.2d 665, 668 (1971), mod~fedinpart, 68 Misc. 2d 955, 328 N.Y.S.2d 362
(1972); supplemented, 69 Misc. 2d 301, 329 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1972); modfed, 73 Misc. 2d
126, 341 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1973); rev'd, 43 A.D.2d 551, 349 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1973); appeal
dirmissed, 34 N.Y.2d 737, 313 N.E.2d 790, 357 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1974) (hearing require-
ment imposed on subsidized landlords no more burdensome than hearing require-
ment imposed by Rent Control Act on private landlords).
311. Most decisions have required housing authorities to provide pre-eviction, ad-
ministrative hearings. See, e.g., Glover v. Housing Auth. of Bessemer, 444 F.2d 158,
161 (5th Cir. 1971) (pre-eviction, evidentiary hearing required for public housing ten-
ant); Caulder v. Durham Hous. Auth., 433 F.2d 998, 1004 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1003 (1971) (public housing tenants must receive hearing prior to decision to
evict them); Escalera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 425 F.2d 853, 863 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970) (public housing tenants facing eviction must have the
opportunity to present their case to impartial official in advance); Owens v. Hous.
Auth. of Stamford, 394 F. Supp. 1267, 1272-73 (D. Conn. 1975) (public housing ten-
ants facing eviction properly stated cause of action based on denial of due process);
Brown v. Housing Auth. of Milwaukee, 340 F. Supp. 114, 115 (E.D. Wis. 1972), a2'd,
471 F.2d 63 (7th Cir. 1972) (that tenants in Wisconsin public housing receive a hear-
ing in state court eviction action does not negate the need for procedural due process
at time PHA sends notice of termination); Housing Auth. of Milwaukee v. Mosby, 53
Wis.2d 275, 286-87, 192 N.W.2d 913, 918 (1972) (HUD circular providing for pre-
eviction administrative hearing applies retroactively to public housing tenants facing
eviction). Current public housing cases are governed by 24 C.F.R. § 866.50 (1979),
which requires a pre-eviction hearing quite independent of whether or not such a
hearing is required by due process.
312. 503 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
313. Id at 621. The Swann trial court, in an unpublished decision and without
any discussion, held in an order issued April 8, 1981, that a pre-eviction administra-
tive hearing was required. See Swam v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., No. 81-1439, (4th
Cir. Apr. 8, 1982). The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that due process required
only proof of good cause during state eviction proceedings.
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b. Good cause
After choosing the forum, the second aspect of "how much process
is due" to a Section 8 existing housing tenant focuses on what a land-
lord must prove in the due process hearing. The law since the deci-
sion in McQueen v. Druker3"4 has required a subsidized landlord to
prove good cause both before a mid-term eviction and when refusing
to renew a tenant's lease.315 HUD accepted the good cause standard
in both of these contexts in subsidized housing, and incorporated the
standard into its eviction regulations for subsidized housing.
316
By contrast, courts and HUD have disagreed over the application
of the good cause standard in proceedings to evict tenants from Sec-
tion 8 existing housing. Three cases have addressed the issue. In
Jeffries v. Georgia Residential Finance Authority,3 17 the court held
that a landlord must show good cause to evict a tenant in the middle
of a lease term.318 In Swann v. Gastonia Housing Authority,319 the
Fourth Circuit affirmed a North Carolina federal district court deci-
sion that a landlord could not refuse to renew a tenant's lease in the
absence of good cause to evict.320 Swann contradicts the holding in a
third case, Cain v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Author-
ity.321 In Cain, a federal district court in Kentucky held that good
cause is not required when a Section 8 existing housing landlord re-
fused to renew a tenants' lease.322 The Cain court accepted the de-
fendant's323 arguments that a Section 8 existing housing tenant's
314. 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970), a'd, 438 F.2d 781 (Ist Cir. 1971).
315. Id at 1131. The good cause requirement originated in the classic, early due
process cases. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
316. 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.607(b)(1)(iii), 881.607(b)(1)(iii) (1980). The agency has de-
fined good cause as "material noncompliance with the lease," material failure to carry
out an obligation under a state landlord-tenant act, or "other good cause." Id at
§§ 880.607(b)(1)(i-iii), 881.607(b)(1)(i-iii).
317. 503 F. Supp. 610 (N.D. Ga. 1980) a fd, No. 81-7389 (11th Cir. June 14,
1982).
318. Id at 617.
319. 502 F. Supp. 362, af'd, No. 81-1439 (4th Cir., April 8, 1982).
320. Id. Slip op. at 7.
321. No. 78-179 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 19, 1980).
322. Id
323. Although HUD has championed this argument before Congress, see notes
336-38 and accompanying text infra, the agency was not a defendant in this litigation.
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property interest is limited to a Certificate of Family Participation; 324
it does not include the tenant's apartment.325 The court added that if
the tenant did have a protected property interest in the apartment, the
absence of state action would negate any requirement of due process
prior to nonrenewal of the lease.32 6
Swann and Jeftries clearly follow precedent while Cain does not.
Courts have consistently held that good cause is required both prior
to mid-term eviction and for lease non-renewals in the subsidized
housing context.327 Previous decisions have defined a tenant's prop-
324. No. 78-179 (E.D. Ky., Dec. 19, 1980).
325. Id
326. Id
327. See Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (4th Cir. 1973) (congressional policy
of providing every American with decent home, and prohibiting arbitrary and dis-
criminatory action against tenants justifies finding of property right in continued oc-
cupancy); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1130 (D. Mass. 1970) (public
housing tenant has status regarded as entitlement in living unit). No courts appar-
ently have held that a tenant's property right ended with the lease. Numerous cases in
nine jurisdictions, however, involving seven different state and federal housing au-
thorities, have required due process for lease nonrenewals. See Lopez v. Henry
Phipps Plaza South, Inc., 498 F.2d 937, 943 (2d Cir. 1970) (tenant has right to contin-
ued occupancy of apartment despite having lease without renewal provision); Wilson
v. Lincoln Redevelopment Corp., 488 F.2d 339, 340 (8th Cir. 1973) (private developer
must provide tenants due process when terminating their tenancies); Joy v. Daniels,
479 F.2d 1236, 1241 (national housing policy creates in tenant a property right or
entitlement to continue occupancy beyond expiration of lease); McLellan v. Univer-
sity Heights, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 374, 379 (D.R.I. 1972) (tenant has right to decent
affordable housing, right not to be uprooted, right to stability as a resident, and right
to be left alone); McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122, 1129 (D. Mass. 1970), aft'd,
438 F.2d 781 (1st Cir. 1971) (statute expressly or impliedly gives assisted tenant a right
to retain occupancy until cause exists for eviction); Green v. Copperstone Ltd. Part-
nership, 28 Md. App. 498, 516, 346 A.2d 686, 697 (1975) (tenant has property right of
entitlement to continued occupancy absent cause to evict other than mere expiration
of lease); Fuller v. Urstadt, 28 N.Y.2d 315, 317, 270 N.E.2d 321, 323, 321 N.Y.S.2d
601, 602 (1971) (subtenants do not have right to renewal of subleases, but cannot be
denied renewal without rational cause); Hudsonview Terrace, Inc. v. Maury, 100
Misc. 2d 331, 332, 419 N.Y.S.2d 409, 410 (1979) (eviction requires cause other than
mere expiration of lease); Tompkins Square Neighbors, Inc. v. Zaragoza, 68 Misc. 2d
103, 105, 326 N.Y.S.2d 665, 667 (1971) (PHA may not terminate monthly lease of
tenant it finds undesirable absent providing notice of good cause and full hearing);
Ivywood Apts. v. Bennett, 51 Ohio App. 2d 209, 214, 367 N.E.2d 1205, 1208 (1976)
(eviction is permissible only after giving timely and adequate notice detailing reasons
for termination, and an adequate hearing that reveals proper reason for eviction).
The three cases in which courts have held that tenants were not entitled to pre-evic-
tion due process based their holdings on findings that no state action was involved
when subsidized landlords evict their tenants. See Weigand v. Afton View Apts., 473
F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1973) (summary eviction actions permissible where only state
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erty right as the interest in living in a specific apartment.328 Since
both eviction and lease nonrenewals deprive the tenant of that right,
he or she is entitled to due process in both contexts.
Two major reasons have emerged for this definition of the tenant's
property right. First, courts have focused on the legislative history of
the housing programs,329 and on Congress' intent to give a decent
house to every American.330 Courts have regularly cited both of
these factors as evidence that Congress intended to create an atmos-
phere of "stability (and) security" where families could live without
fear of arbitrary eviction.331 A second argument for this position on
tenants' rights is that tenants have a reasonable expectation that
under normal circumstances they will be permitted to remain in the
housing indefinitely.332
HUD's official position is that it opposes a good cause standard,
both in the context of lease nonrenewals and in mid-term evic-
tions.3 33 In fact, however, HUD is more willing to enter into settle-
ments in which good cause is required prior to mid-term evictions
than it is to settle when plaintiffs seek good cause prior to nonrenewal
of a lease.334
involvement in private housing consist of tax exemption); McGuane v. Chenango
Court, Inc., 431 F.2d 1189, 1190 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971)
(receipt of federal benefits in form of mortgage insurance does not transform private
builder into a state agency for purposes of procedural due process); Flamm v. Real-
Bit., Inc., 168 Mont. 351, 355, 543 P.2d 190, 192 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 941
(1976) (receipt of federal benefits in the form of mortgage insurance and rent supple-
ments under the subsidized housing program statute does not make private corpora-
tion a state of federal agency for due process purposes).
328. Id.
329. See, e.g., Joy v. Daniels, 479 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1973); Swam v. Gastonia
Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. 362 (W.D. N.C. 1980), aj'd, No. 81-1439 (4th Cir., Apr. 8,
1982).
330. 479 F.2d at 1240, citing, 12 U.S.C. § 1701(t) (1976).
331. McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. at 1130.
332. Swanm v. Gastonia Hous. Auth., 502 F. Supp. at 366, affd, No. 81-1439 (4th
Cir., Apr. 8, 1982). The court noted that Joy and other decisions determined that
tenants had a reasonable expectation of retaining their assisted housing because land-
lords customarily renew leases absent some specific reason. Id
Usually the subsidized housing cases such as Joy and McQueen draw first from the
language of the statute and its legislative history. Courts then "bolster" their conten-
tions with evidence that landlords customarily renew leases. Swann §witches this or-
der, suggesting that the legislative history bolsters the custom of renewal. Id. at 366.
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Although the decision in Cain vindicated the position of HUD and
the PHAs, they remained sufficiently concerned about the contrary
trial court holdings in Swann and Jefries to ask Congress for correc-
tive legislation. 35
B. Statutory Change
HUD failed in two previous attempts to convince Congress to re-
peal the statutory provision that required PHAs to send Section 8
existing housing eviction notices.336 In 1981, Congress acted but gave
HUD less than it wanted. The agency had hoped that Congress
would abolish due process requirements for tenants by writing into
the statute a provision limiting a participant's property interest to the
Certificate of Family Participation. 3 7 HUD's proposed language
passed the Senate but not the House.338 In the conference committee,
conferees rejected HUD's proposed limitations on tenants' property
interests in their Section 8 existing housing.33 9 One possible reason
for the rejection is that most PHAs did not share all of HUD's con-
cerns about the issue.3" Their goal was to eliminate the requirement
that they send the eviction notices; they did not oppose the good
cause requirement for evictions.3 4
The greatest division of opinion in the committee occurred over the
335. See notes 336-41 and accompanying text infra. As a postscript to the Jefries-
Swann-Cain discussion, while these cases alone have resulted in decisions on "good
cause", tenants' lawyers have filed numerous lawsuits to gain due process rights for
Section 8 existing housing tenants by using a "good cause" argument. See, e.g., Alex-
ander v. Landrieu, No. 80-1321 (D. Col., filed Oct. 1, 1980); Fleming v. Landrieu, No.
C80-1393A (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 5, 1980); Piretti v. Hyman, No. 79-622-K (D.
Mass., filed June 23, 1979); Doscocz v. Alameda Co. Hous. Auth., No. 65975-8 (N.D.
Cal., filed Apr. 23, 1979).
336. Telephone interview with David Bryson, attorney for the National Housing
Law Project, in Berkeley, Cal. (Sept. 1, 1981).
337. HUD's proposed language read as follows: "The procedural and substantive
rights of a tenant of Section 8 Existing Housing to occupancy of a particular unit are
determined by the terms of the lease, in accordance with State and local law." S. REP.
No. 97-139, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 256, reprinted in [1981] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 527, 552.
338. H. CONF. REP. No. 97-208, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 694, reprinted in [1981] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1018, 1053.
339. Id
340. Telephone interview with Richard Y. Nelson, Jr., Deputy Executive Direc-
tor, NAHRO (July 1, 1981).
341. Id
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issue of applying the good cause standard to lease nonrenewals as
well as to mid-term evictions. A markedly intelligent compromise
produced the following language:
i the lease between the tenant and the owner shall be for at
least one year or the term of (the contract between HUD and the
PHA), whichever is shorter, and shall contain other terms and
conditions specified by the Secretary; and
ii the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except for seri-
ous or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the
lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or
for other good cause."
Essentially, the landlord has two choices when deciding not to renew
a lease. The landlord may continue in the Section 8 existing housing
program only by proving good cause for refusing to renew a lease at a
due process hearing. Alternatively, the landlord may dispense with
the good cause showing and refuse to renew the lease for any reason
allowable under state law if his preference is to drop out of the
program.
This resolution, of course, is subject to abuse. In order to be rid of
a tenant who continually complains about disrepair, or who refuses
to make the illegal payoffs, a landlord may refuse to renew the lease,
drop out of the program for one or two years, and subsequently at-
tempt to reenter. It can only be hoped that most landlords will find
such gimmicks not worth their trouble.
V. TENANTS' RIGHTS IN A HOUSING VOUCHER PROGRAM
The. Reagan administration has made few details of its housing
voucher program available.343 It appears, however, that tenants'
rights under such a program will resemble in certain basic respects
tenants' rights in the Section 8 existing housing program.3'44 One
similarity between participants in the two programs will be their rela-
tionship to potential landlords. As with the holders of Section 8 ex-
isting housing Certificates of Family Participation, courts will
probably find that a private landlord's refusal to rent to a voucher
342. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 1981 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (95 Stat.) amending 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(d)(1)(B) (1976).
343. See notes 56-69 and accompanying text supra.
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holder does not constitute state action.3 45 Thus, courts will not re-
quire landlords to follow due process procedures when rejecting ap-
plicants, 46 nor will they limit landlords' discretion to reject tenants
because of their poverty347 or for any other lawful reason.34  As a
result, voucher holders will lack the due process and substantive pro-
tections that cases such as Holmes, Neddo, and Fletcher have given to
public housing applicants.349
In contrast, applicants for housing vouchers probably will have
many of the due process and substantive protections available to pub-
lic housing applicants on the "upper level" of the voucher program
(that is, in their relationship with the PHA in charge of allocating
vouchers).35" As in Section 8 existing housing, courts most likely will
require PHAs to follow due process procedures both in allocating
vouchers35' and in providing a hearing to any applicant who is de-
nied a voucher or whose voucher is rescinded.35 z It remains unclear
whether PHAs will receive broad discretion to use criteria for allocat-
ing vouchers in addition to the basic eligibility standards. Whether
courts hearing voucher cases follow Baker and Vandermark (which
allow PHAs very broad discretion),3 53 or Ferguson (which does
not)35 4 depends in part on how the housing voucher statute is written,
and perhaps on whether future Section 8 cases follow Baker and Van-
dermark, or Ferguson.354a Ultimately, however, the holder of a
voucher (like the recipient of a Section 8 certificate) has no place to
live until a private landlord agrees to rent an apartment.355 Thus, on
balance, voucher holders seemingly will have less effective legal pro-
tection than do applicants to either public or subsidized housing.3 56
345. See note 239 and accompanying text supra.
346. Id
347. See note 240 and accompanying text supra.
348. Id
349. See notes 225-28 and accompanying text supra.
350. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.
351. See notes 115-19 and accompanying text supra.
352. See notes 147-59 and accompanying text supra.
353. See notes 210-24 and accompanying text supra.
354. See notes 202-09 and accompanying text supra.
354a. See note 224a supra.
355. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
356. For a discussion of the legal protections afforded to public housing appli-
cants, see notes 91-99, 127-39, 182-93, and accompanying text supra. For a similar
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The future of tenants' rights prior to eviction in a housing voucher
program is difficult to foresee. Congress' decision in the Section 8
context to abandon its attempt to deny tenants all pre-eviction due
process357 has meant that the courts have not had to decide whether
such an attempt, if successful, would be constitutional.
Courts may well have to confront this issue in the housing voucher
context. The Reagan administration is currently considering aban-
donment of the rules establishing pre-eviction due process procedures
in public housing.35s Thus, the administration's voucher program
possibly may also attempt to avoid pre-eviction due process require-
ments. Presumably, the administration would accomplish this end by
limiting the definition of a recipient's property interest to the
voucher, and excluding the apartment. Thus, the administration
would attempt to win in the voucher context the battle recently lost in
the context of Section 8.
The strategy of defining recipients' property interest so as to pre-
clude due process requirements is based on language in recent
Supreme Court due process cases.36° These decisions suggest that
legislatures may define the nature of property interests in the govern-
mental benefits they confer.36' Justice Rehnquist first established this
position in his plurality opinion in Arnelt v. Kennedy.362 In Arnelt,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Service law that
provides a post-dismissal "paper hearing" to a discharged govern-
ment employee.363 Justice Rehnquist's opinion rests on the theory
that "where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably inter-
twined with the limitation on the procedures which are to be em-
ployed in determining that right, a litigant. . . must take the bitter
with the sweet." 3 4
discussion in the subsidized housing context, see notes 101-14, 140-46, 194-95, and
accompanying text supra.
357. See notes 336-42 and accompanying text supra.
358. See Washington Post, Aug. 13, 1981, at A27, col. 4.
359. See notes 336-42 and accompanying text supra.
360. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974).
361. See notes 362-71 and accompanying text infra.
362. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined the plu-
rality, while the remainder of the Court divided into two concurring and two dissent-
ing opinions.
363. Id at 163.
364. Id at 153-54.
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A majority of the Court365 disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's ra-
tionale. Justice Powell concurred in part with the result, but stated
that the plurality "misconstrues the origin of the right to procedural
due process. That right is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by
constitutional guarantee." 3  Later, however, in Bishop v. Wood,367 a
minority of the Court368 accused the majority of "effectively adopting
the analysis rejected by the majority of the Court in Arnell."'369
Bishop upheld the firing of a state policeman without a hearing on
the grounds that the state never intended to give the policeman a
property interest in his job.3 7 ° Absent such a property interest, the
court said due process was not required.37'
The Senate's language stating that a Section 8 existing housing ten-
ant has a property interest only in the Certificate, not the apart-
ment,372 was a bold attempt to call the Supreme Court's bluff. The
Senate designed the language to persuade courts that Section 8 ex-
isting housing tenants must take the "bitter" lack of due process pro-
cedures with the "sweet" rent subsidy package.3 73 If the Reagan
administration were successful in summoning the votes to pass simi-
lar language in a housing voucher program, the Supreme Court
would have to face the difficult question of how far Justice Rehn-
quist's "bitter with the sweet" principle can be taken. As Professor
Lawrence Tribe has stated, once the Court has held that Congress
may define the nature of the entitlement, it becomes difficult to define
a consistent role for the courts and the constitution.374 Could Con-
gress overrule Goldberg v. Kelly simply by passing a law defining a
welfare recipient's entitlement as a right (a privilege?) that is not a
property right?
365. Justice Blackmun joined in Justice Powell's concurring opinion. Justice
White concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Douglas, and Justice Marshall
joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, filed dissenting opinions.
366. 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring).
367. 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
368. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented in three sepa-
rate opinions.
369. 426 U.S. at 353, n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
370. Id at 347.
371. Id at 350.
372. See notes 336-37 and accompanying text supra.
373. S. REP. No. 139, 97TH CONG., 1ST SEsS. 231 (1981), reprintedin [1981] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 527.
374. L. TmBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 532-63 (1978).
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If the enabling statute states that voucher holders-unlike tenants
in every other federally assisted housing program-have no right to a
pre-eviction due process hearing, the Supreme Court may well have
the opportunity to answer this question.
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